Estimating Degree of Market Power and Price-Response Strategies in a Product-Differentiated Oligopoly: The Case of Canned Tuna Industry in a Local Market by Daloonpate, Apichart
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
8-2002
Estimating Degree of Market Power and Price-
Response Strategies in a Product-Differentiated
Oligopoly: The Case of Canned Tuna Industry in a
Local Market
Apichart Daloonpate
University of Tennessee - Knoxville
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more
information, please contact trace@utk.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daloonpate, Apichart, "Estimating Degree of Market Power and Price-Response Strategies in a Product-Differentiated Oligopoly: The
Case of Canned Tuna Industry in a Local Market. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2002.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2119
To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Apichart Daloonpate entitled "Estimating Degree of
Market Power and Price-Response Strategies in a Product-Differentiated Oligopoly: The Case of Canned
Tuna Industry in a Local Market." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form
and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Economics.
Dr. Matthew N. Murray, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Dr. Robert A. Bohm, Dr. Hui Chang, Dr. David B. Eastwood
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
To the Graduate Council: 
 
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Apichart Daloonpate entitled 
“Estimating Degree of Market Power and Price-Response Strategies in a Product-
Differentiated Oligopoly: The Case of Canned Tuna Industry in a Local Market.”  I have 
examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and 
recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Economics. 
 
 
                                                                                            Dr. Matthew N. Murray 
                   Major Professor 
       
 
 
 
We have read this dissertation  
and recommend its acceptance: 
 
 
Dr. Robert A. Bohm                                                       
 
 
Dr. Hui Chang                                 
 
 
Dr. David B. Eastwood                         
 
 
 
 
          Acceptance for the Council: 
 
          Dr. Anne Mayhew 
          Vice Provost and  
    Dean of Graduate Studies 
 
 
 
  (Original signatures are on file with official student records.) 
 
 
 
 
ESTIMATING THE DEGREE OF MARKET POWER AND PRICE-
RESPONSE STRATEGIES IN A PRODUCT-DIFFERENTIATED 
OLIGOPOLY: THE CASE OF THE CANNED TUNA INDUSTRY IN A 
LOCAL MARKET 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation  
Presented for the 
Doctor of Philosophy  
Degree 
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apichart  Daloonpate 
August 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 DEDICATION 
 
This dissertation is dedicated to my wonderful parents, 
Colonel Suporn and Mrs. Sudjai Daloonpate, 
to my brothers, 
Pol. Lt. Col. Adul and Mr. Phichit Daloonpate, 
to my sister 
Capt. Sineenuch  Daloonpate, 
and to the rest of the family 
for always believing in me, inspiring me, and encouraging me to achieve my goals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 This dissertation was completed with the assistance of many people to whom I 
wish to acknowledge and thank.  First, I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. 
Matthew Murray and Dr. David Eastwood for their assistance and effective guidance 
throughout this project.  I thank Dr. Robert Bohm and Dr. Hui Chang for their support 
and suggestions.  Likewise, I am thankful for many useful discussions with Dr. Victor 
Stango, Dr. John Barkoulas, Mark Tuttle, and Lee Greer.  
 I thank the Department of Economics for the financial support during my Ph.D. 
program, and the Scholarly Research Grant Program of the College of Business 
Administration for the financial support for the costs of this dissertation.   
 I would like to thank my big brothers, Adul and Pichit Daloonpate, my younger 
sister, Sineenush Daloonpate, and the rest of my family for their unlimited support and 
love.  Finally, I would like to express my gratefulness for the unending love, support and 
encouragement of my wonderful parents, Suporn and Sudjai Daloonpate.  I love you, Dad 
and Mom.    
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation estimates the degree of market power and strategic-price 
responses among brands in the canned tuna industry in a local market.  Weekly scanner 
data on the purchases of canned-tuna in Knoxville, Tennessee collected by Information 
Resources, Incorporated (IRI) were used for the estimation of the degree of market power 
and strategic-price responses.  Four canned tuna brands were investigated including the 
three leading brands, Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, and Bumble Bee, and the competitive 
small-market share brands aggregated into Allother.    
  There are two empirical parts.  The first part focuses on estimation of the degrees 
of market power and strategic-price responses among canned tuna brands in the market 
based on a static approach.  The second part investigates strategic-price responses based 
on a dynamic approach. 
 In the first part, the market is assumed to be operated under Bertrand competition 
such that price is a strategic variable, and brands make their choices simultaneously.  
Measures of the degree of market power include the Rothschild index (RI), the O index 
(OI) and the Chamberlin quotient (CQ).  In order to calculate these measures, each firm’s 
own-and cross-price elasticities and price-response elasticities are needed.  These 
elasticities are estimated by using simultaneous equations, including the linear 
approximate almost ideal demand system (LA/AIDS) with the corrected Stone price 
index and price-reaction equations.  The static analysis finds evidence of market power in 
the canned tuna market.  Starkist and Chicken of the Sea have high market power derived 
from both unilateral and coordinated market power, whereas Bumble Bee maintains its 
market power without coordination.  The strategic-price responses among brands are 
 iv 
investigated through the estimated price-reaction equations.  The results show that 
Bumble Bee conducts warfare against Starkist and Chicken of the Sea.  Starkist and 
Chicken of the Sea positively respond to each other’s price; however, they do not respond 
to Bumble Bee’s price.   
In the second part, the Bertrand-competition assumption is replaced by an 
assumption that a firm in the market sets its price depending on its own past prices and 
those of rivals.  A vector autoregressive (VAR) model is employed and its applications, 
including the Granger-causality test, the impulse response function (IRF) analysis, and 
the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) analysis, are used to investigate the 
dynamic price relationships.  This study finds that although Starkist and Chicken of the 
Sea do not respond Bumble Bee’s price strategy during the same time period, they do 
over time.  The findings of the second part offer valuable insights in that the study of 
strategic-price responses based on both static and dynamic approaches provide 
significantly better understanding in firms’ pricing behaviors.    
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Motivations 
One of the most important issues in industrial organization concerns market 
structure.   The elements that indicate the market structure in industrial organization 
generally include concentration, product differentiation, and entry barriers.  Industrial 
organization economists have tried to analyze the degree of competitiveness of industrial 
markets in several directions based on these elements.  Appelbaum (1982) and Schroeter 
(1988) used the concept of market concentration to study the degree of market power in 
industrial markets by estimating the Lerner index, the difference between price and 
marginal cost as a proportion of price.  To estimate such an index, the studies had to 
assume that products are homogeneous.   Therefore, the estimated Lerner index for each 
industry represented the degree of market power of that industry as a whole, but the 
degree of market power among firms in the industry was not estimated.   Although 
economists consider some industrial products to be homogeneous, product differentiation 
does occur in industrial markets.  Unlike competitive markets, firms in oligopolies or 
monopolistically competitive markets are able to set their prices differently from one 
another and higher than their marginal costs because their products are differentiated.   
Several researchers have investigated the degree of market power among firms in 
product-differentiated oligopolies using different methods.  Liang (1989) estimated the 
degree of market power in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry by estimating price-
conjectural variations and price-response elasticities.  The degree of market power in 
Liang’s research is based on the ability of pairs of firms to engage in collusion.  Nevo 
(2001) examined the nearly collusive-pricing behavior and intense non-price competition 
in the ready-to-eat cereal industry by the estimation of price-cost margins.   Cotterill 
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(1994) and Vickner and Davies (1999) estimated the degree of market power in the 
carbonated-soft drink industry and the spaghetti sauce industry, respectively.  The degree 
of market power in both studies is derived from two sources, unilateral market power and 
coordinated market power, and is estimated by three measures; the Rothschild Index (RI), 
the O Index (OI) and the Chamberlain Quotient (CQ).  This dissertation is motivated by 
the work of Cotterill, and Vickner and Davies. 
   
Research Objectives 
There are two main objectives of this dissertation.  The first objective is to 
estimate the degree of market power in a product-differentiated oligopoly, the canned 
tuna industry in a local market.  The second objective is to investigate price-response 
relationships among firms in the industry based on the static and dynamic approaches.   
This study chooses the domestic canned tuna industry as a representative 
processed agricultural product in a product-differentiated oligopoly to estimate the degree 
of market power and strategic price response for various reasons.  It is a structural 
oligopoly in which products are manufactured mainly by the big three companies, 
Starkist, Bumble Bee, and Chicken of the Sea, with their combined market share in 2000 
approximately 82 percent of the $2.1 billion canned tuna industry in the U.S. (Fulmer, 
2001).   Tuna has been the largest selling seafood in the U.S. in the past several years 
(Maclean Hunter Media Inc., 1997).  Canned tuna is a durable good because its shelf life 
exceeds the period of time between price changes (Tirole, 1988).  Since canned tuna can 
be stored over time, consumers can store the product when its price is decreased.  
Therefore, it turns out to be an inter-temporal substitute for itself.   Several canned-tuna 
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brands are sold in the same stores, and consumers are able to compare prices across the 
brands.  As a result, each brand faces not only its inter-temporal substitute, but also the 
inter-brand competition.   Moreover, canned tuna products are differentiated by brand, 
flavor, package, size, and advertising.  Since there is product differentiation, firms 
potentially are able to set prices above marginal costs.  In addition, firms’ pricing 
behaviors are interdependent because they operate in an oligopoly market.  For these 
reasons, it is of interest to study the degree of market power along with the price-response 
strategies among firms. 
The scanner data used in this research are primary data that represent a readily 
current and timely source of precise product-specific information including price, 
quantity, expenditure, and marketing activities for a large number of products available 
on a daily basis.  Nayga (1992) argued that “scanner data may become the most detailed 
and definitive source of retail food industry statistics available to researchers and 
marketing executives”.  This study uses the weekly scanner data of canned-tuna prices, 
quantity purchased, and promotional information in a local market, Knoxville, Tennessee.  
The scanner data in this study were collected weekly for 157 weeks over the period of 
January 4, 1998 to December 31, 2000 from 134 supermarkets in Knoxville, Tennessee 
by Information Resources, Incorporated (IRI), a market-research company that processes 
scanner data into a usable format for researchers.1 
 
 
                                                 
1 This research was funded by a grant from the Scholarly Research Grant Program of the College of 
Business Administration at The University of Tennessee. 
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Estimating Degree of Market Power 
With respect to the first objective, this study estimates the degree of market power 
based on the three measures: the RI, OI and CQ.  In order to calculate these measures, 
each firm’s own-and cross-price elasticities and price-response elasticities are needed.  
These elasticities are estimated by simultaneous demand-supply equations based on the 
Bertrand competition assumption such that price is the strategic choice variable and firms 
make their choices simultaneously.  Following Cotterill (1994), this study employs the 
linear approximate almost ideal demand system (LA/AIDS) proposed by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980) to estimate the demand for canned tuna in the market and the price-
reaction functions to investigate strategic-price response among firms.  The LA/AIDS is a 
modification by Deaton and Muellbauer from their almost ideal demand system (AIDS) 
to replace the non-linear price index with the Stone price index.  Cotterill (1994) and 
Vickner and Davies (1999) used the LA/AIDS in estimating the degree of market power. 
Use of the Stone index in the LA/AIDS causes estimated parameters to be biased 
and inconsistent (Pashardes, 1993 and Moschini, 1995).  This dissertation uses the 
corrected Stone index suggested by Moschini (1995) in the LA/AIDS estimation.  The 
results of the measures of market power found in this dissertation are consistent with 
those of Cotterill (1994) and Vickner and Davies (1999) in that the leading firms which 
are able to maintain high prices and market shares have high degrees of market power.  In 
addition, this dissertation re-estimates the simultaneous equations with the use of the 
traditional Stone index in the LA/AIDS and the parameter estimates are compared to 
those of the corrected version.  The results from both versions are found to be very close 
giving the interpretation of market power in the same fashion.  This study found that 
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Starkist, the highest-market share brand, has the highest degree of market power.  The 
market power of Starkist and Chicken of the Sea is derived from both unilateral and 
coordinated market power, whereas that of Bumble Bee is derived from its own unilateral 
market power, not from coordinated market power.   
   
Investigating Price-Response Strategies 
The investigation is divided into two parts because the second objective in this 
dissertation is to investigate the strategic price-response relationships among firms in the 
canned tuna industry based on both static and dynamic approaches.  In part one, the price 
response relationships are investigated through the price-reaction functions from the 
estimated simultaneous equations.  This investigation is based on the static approach 
because Bertrand-competition assumes that the price strategies are made simultaneously 
by each firm.  Starkist and Chicken of the Sea are found to respond positively to each 
other.  Bumble Bee seems to conduct price war against its rivals since it responds 
negatively to Starkist’s and Chicken of the Sea’s price strategies.  On the other hand, both 
Starkist and Chicken of the Sea do not respond to Bumble Bee’s price strategy during the 
same time period.  However, Bumble Bee is one of the leading brands in the market; 
therefore, the results in the first part raise the interesting question of whether Bumble 
Bee’s price strategy in past periods may affect Starkist’s and Chicken of the Sea’s price 
strategies in the current period.   
The second part of this dissertation investigates further the price-response 
relationships among firms based on a dynamic approach.  The Bertrand-competition 
assumption is replaced by an assumption that a firm in the market sets its price depending 
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on its own past prices and those of rivals.  A vector autoregressive (VAR) model is 
employed.  The strategic-price responses are investigated using the VAR’s applications 
including the Granger-causality test, the impulse response function (IRF) analysis, and 
the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) analysis.  The Granger-causality test 
examines whether the dynamic price-response relationships exist.  The IRF analysis 
graphically reveals the direction of the effect of a one-time shock to one of the 
innovations on future values of the endogenous variables, whereas the FEVD analysis 
measures proportions of a brand’s price variations that can be explained by shocks to its 
own price and it rivals’ prices for each forecast horizon.  Although the results from part 
one indicate that Starkist and Chicken of the Sea do not respond Bumble Bee’s price 
strategy during the same time period, the Granger-causality results show that both 
Starkist and Chicken of the Sea respond negatively to Bumble Bee’s past price.  The 
results from the IRF and FEVD analyses also support the Granger-causality test results 
for the three-leading canned-tuna brands’ relationships.   
In summary, this dissertation estimates the degree of market power and 
investigates strategic-price responses among firms in the canned tuna industry in the 
Knoxville, Tennessee market.  The strategic-price responses are investigated using both 
static and dynamic approaches.  Part one estimates the degree of market power and price-
response relationships based on a static approach.  Part two investigates the dynamic 
price-response relationships.  Overall, the results from both parts of this dissertation 
provide helpful insights on the degree of market power and strategic-price responses 
among firms in the canned tuna market.   
 7 
Contributions of this Dissertation 
 The first contribution of this dissertation is to improve the model specification in 
estimating the degree of market power as developed by Cotterill (1994) and followed by 
Vickner and Davies (1999).   In their studies, Cotterill (1994), and Vickner and Davies 
(1999) measured the degree of market power in the carbonated soft drink industry 
(Cotterill) and the spaghetti sauce industry (Vickner and Davies) by estimating the 
LA/AIDS model and price reaction functions simultaneously.  In this study, the corrected 
Stone index suggested by Moschini (1995) is used in the LA/AIDS model.    
Second, this study is the first to examine the degree of competitiveness of brands 
of a manufactured food product at the local level.  Work to date on food manufacture 
degree of market power and pricing strategies has been conducted at the aggregate 
national level (Appelbaum, 1982; Schroeter, 1988; Baker and Breshnahan, 1985; Liang, 
1989; Cotterill, 1994; and Vickner and Davies, 1999).  These studies have not captured 
local market effects on pricing conduct and local demand.  Only the studies of Cotterill 
(1994), and Vickner and Davies (1999) have used scanner data in investigating the degree 
of market power.   Nayga (1992) suggested that due to the enormous information and the 
high cost of acquisition involved with scanner data, an individual researcher may not be 
able to efficiently collect or organize the volume of information.  Individual researchers 
might have to form a team and combine their efforts when conducting research in a 
national or regional level to become cost effective.  Otherwise, “individual researchers 
should just focus on a local retail firm with multiple stores” (Nayga, 1992).    Nayga 
(1992) suggested that scanner data from supermarkets in a particular location present a 
controlled situation.  Therefore, the community specific results may not contribute to 
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broad regional or national inferences.  This dissertation estimates the degree of market 
power and strategic price response in canned tuna industry in a specific local market, 
Knoxville, Tennessee.  Although demographic information is not available, the study 
should provide information regarding the degree of competitiveness and price strategies 
among firms in a local market.  
Third, this dissertation not only refines Cotterill’s, and Vickner and Davies’ work, 
but also extends their research to dynamic analysis.  Due to the previous work (Cotterill, 
1994; and Vickner and Davies, 1999), the Bertrand price reaction model yields 
information of strategic price response through the price-response elasticities.   These 
results show pricing behaviors among firms in a static way.  In other words, a firm sets its 
price responding to its rivals’ prices in the present time.  In fact, firms’ strategies may 
respond to one another depending not only on today’s information, but also on past 
information.   This study employs a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to investigate 
dynamic price relationships among firms in the canned tuna market.   
Regarding previous industrial-organization research in this area, Vickner and 
Davies (2000) estimated strategic-price response between two leading brands in the 
canned pineapple industry using the VAR and vector error correction model.  The 
Granger causality test and the IRF analysis were applied to investigate the price 
relationships.  With respect to the IRF analysis, confidence intervals are used to evaluate 
the statistical reliability of the estimated results.  However, confidence intervals were not 
included in Vickner and Davies’ IRF analysis.  This may affect the interpretation of their 
empirical results.  This dissertation improves the price-response study by including 
confidence intervals in the IRF results to determine whether the estimated price-response 
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relationships are asymptotically and statistically significant.  In addition, the FEVD 
analysis, one of the useful VAR applications which measures proportions of a brand’s 
price variations that can be explained by shocks to its own price and it rivals’ prices for 
each forecast horizon, was not employed in the Vickner and Davies study.  The FEVD 
results can give additional information to the IRF and Granger-causality results in 
estimating price-response effects.  Therefore, this dissertation includes the FEVD 
analysis to rigorously investigate pricing relationships.  
 
Limitations and Extensions 
Limitations of this dissertation mainly involve the data.  First, demographic and 
brands’ cost data are not included.  Second, this study was not able to take into account 
the effects of the use of brands’ coupons because IRI does not report the extent of their 
use.  Third, the time period of observations is short.  Therefore, strategic-price responses 
among firms in the long run may not be captured.   Finally, the price-response analysis in 
the second part investigates only whether the price relationships exist.  The VAR’s 
applications do not provide statistical magnitudes concerning the price relationships. 
 This dissertation can be extended in several ways.  In a local market, store brands 
such as Kroger and BI-LO may have some effects on the national brands’ demand and 
price strategies.  One extension is to include store brands as key variables in the 
estimation of the degree of market power and price-response strategies among the canned 
tuna brands in a local market.  Another extension is to find a way to include both static 
and dynamic information in the estimation of the degree of market power.  Measures of 
the degree of market power need information of demand and price-response elasticities 
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based on a static approach.  Since this dissertation has shown that firms’ price strategies 
are both static and dynamic, future studies might find a method to measure the degree of 
market power that is able to take into account both static and dynamic information in 
their investigations.   
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 A firm is said to have market power if the firm is able to raise price profitably 
above its marginal cost without losing its market share.  One reason this can occur is 
because the products are differentiated.  Consumers perceive that brands in a market are 
imperfect substitutes.  As a result, a firm may raise its price above that of its rivals 
without losing its market share.  In this case, the competitive tactics of firms in the 
market may use advertising to emphasize product features.  However, in a product-
differentiated oligopoly, although products differ, they can be substituted.  Firms are 
interdependent in the way that if a firm’s price is too high compared to that of its rivals, 
consumers may switch to competitors.  Therefore, price is also a strategic variable in the 
product-differentiated oligopoly market.    
 
Objectives 
 The main objectives of this first part are to estimate the degree of market power 
and to investigate strategic-price responses among firms in the canned tuna market at the 
local level.  The $2.1 billion canned tuna market is selected as a representative product-
differentiated oligopoly (Casamar Group, Inc., 2001).  This dissertation focuses the 
estimation on the local level with Knoxville, Tennessee as a representative local market.  
The data are scanner data which have been actively used in food marketing and economic 
research since the 1980s (Nayga, 1992).  The scanner-data set in this study were collected 
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weekly by Information Resources, Incorporated (IRI) for 157 weeks over the period of 
January 4, 1998 to December 31, 2000 from 134 supermarkets in Knoxville, Tennessee. 
 In an oligopolistic market, when a firm’s product is differentiated from the others, 
a demand curve facing the firm is downward-sloping.  Carlton and Perloff (2000) stated 
“that if a firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve, it has market power.”  The firm’s 
downward-sloping demand curve becomes less elastic if the firm has high market power; 
however due to the presence of substitution it is more elastic than that of a monopolist, 
which is a market-wide demand curve.  If the firm increases price and can influence all of 
its rivals to follow its strategy, the demand curve facing the firm becomes a close 
reflection of the market-wide demand curve, and the firm is said to have extremely high 
market power with full collusion.   
 Rothschild (1942) introduced a theoretical measure of the degree of market power 
called the Rothschild Index (RI).  Later, Cotterill (1994) modified the RI to be more 
applicable with the use of elasticities.   The main idea of the RI is that it compares a 
firm’s own-price elasticity of demand when none of its rivals are collusive, which is 
called the non-followship demand elasticity, with the fully collusive demand elasticity.  
The closer to one the RI is, the greater the degree of market power.  However, the RI 
measures only unilateral market power, ignoring the effects of partial collusion among 
firms.  Basically, firms in a product-differentiated oligopoly are interdependent.  
Therefore, partial collusion exists.  Cotterill introduced two more measures of market 
power called the O Index (OI) and the Chamberlin Quotient (CQ) in order to take into 
account market power from partial collusion of which Cotterill called coordinated market 
power.   
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In order to calculate the RI, OI, and CQ, own-price and cross-price elasticities of 
demand and price-response elasticities of each firm are needed.  Following Cotterill 
(1994), this dissertation employs the demand-supply simultaneous equations to estimate 
such elasticities assuming that the canned tuna market is operated under Bertrand 
competition such that price is strategic variable and firms make their decisions 
simultatneousely.  On the demand side, the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand 
System (LA/AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) is used.  Price-reaction 
equations represent the supply-side of the system.  In their research, Cotterill (1994) and 
Vickner and Davies (1999) used the Stone index in the LA/AIDS in estimating the degree 
of market power.  However, some studies found that the use of the Stone index in the 
LA/AIDS causes estimated parameters to be biased and inconsistent (Pashardes, 1993 
and Moschini, 1995).  This dissertation uses a corrected Stone index suggested by 
Moschini (1995) in the LA/AIDS estimation to estimate the degree of market power 
among brands in the canned tuna market.  In addition, the estimated price-reaction 
functions are used to investigate strategic-price responses among brands in the market. 
Four canned tuna brands are estimated: Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, Bumble Bee, 
and Allother.   The study finds consistency between firms’ market shares and their market 
power in a positive way. Starkist, the brand with the highest market share, has the highest 
degree of market power.  Its market power is derived from both unilateral and 
coordinated market power.  Interestingly, Bumble Bee is able to maintain its market 
power without collusion from its rivals.  With respect to the price relationships, Starkist 
and Chicken of the Sea respond positively to each other strategy, but they do not respond 
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to the Bumble Bee strategy.  In addition, the study finds an evidence of price war on 
Bumble Bee against Starkist and Chicken of the the Sea.   
The remainder of this first part is organized as follows.  The theoretical 
framework and literature review are presented in Chapter Two.  Chapter Three discusses 
the scanner data followed by a presentation of the econometric method used in this 
research.  Chapter Four reports the estimated results and Chapter Five presents a 
conclusion.   
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Chapter Two  
Theoretical framework and Literature Review  
 
 The degree of market power in this study was measured in three ways: the 
Rothschild and O indices, and the Chamberlin Quotient.  In order to calculate these 
measures, we have to estimate partial own- and cross-price elasticities, and price-
response elasticities for each brand.   In this study, the partial own- and cross-price 
elasticities were estimated using the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System 
(LA/AIDS), whereas the price-response elasticities were estimated using price reactions 
functions.    This chapter reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical literature 
associated with LA/AIDS and price-reaction functions.   It provides a structure for 
extensions of the models and associated empirical work described in subsequent chapters.  
 
The Market Power Analysis 
One of the main objectives of this dissertation is to estimate the degree of market 
power in the canned tuna industry.  Greer (1992) states that “market power is the ability 
to influence market price and/or subdue rivals”.  Greer indicates that it is market structure 
that determines ability.  Variations in the features of market structure cause variations in 
demand and supply.  Perfect competition and monopoly are the two polar cases of market 
structure.  In a perfectly competitive market, the demand curve facing a firm is horizontal 
because each firm has no control over price.  On the other hand, a monopolist’s demand 
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curve represents the market-wide demand curve because the monopolist has no 
competition.  
Between these two polar cases, an oligopoly market is an intermediate situation of 
“rivalry” among a small number of firms.  An oligopolistic firm potentially faces two 
kinds of downward-sloping demand curves; a followship demand curve and a non-
followship demand curve, “neither of which is the market-wide demand curve.  The firm 
might face either one or both or portions of both of these demand curves, depending on 
what assumptions it makes concerning its rivals’ behavior.” (Greer, 1992)  
1. The followship demand curve (FD). 
The FD curve facing a firm occurs if firms try to maintain their market shares.  For 
example, a price increase by one firm is matched by its competitors such that their market 
shares are unchanged.  Hence, the followship demand curve could be called a “constant 
share” demand curve.  Greer mentions that the followship demand curve is “a close 
reflection of the market-wide demand curve” (Greer, 1992).  If the firm has an ability to 
influence the market price and then its rivals follow, this indicates the firm has some 
market power.  In economic applications with an oligopoly market, the followship 
demand curve facing a firm can be viewed as the firm’s demand curve with perfectly tacit 
collusion.   
2. The non-followship demand curve (NFD). 
The NFD curve facing a firm occurs if the firm has no power to influence the market 
price.  Therefore, an increase in its price is not matched by its rivals and that firms’ 
market share changes.  The NFD curve could be called a “changing market share curve.”   
The elasticity of the NFD curve is much higher than the elasticity of the FD curve in 
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absolute value because a firm will get a substantial increase in quantity sold in the market 
if it cuts its price, and a considerable decrease in customers if it raises its price since its 
rivals do not match the price change.  The NFD curve varies in elasticity across firms 
within a given market.  In economic applications with an oligopoly market, the non-
followship demand curve reflects a non-collusive situation. 
Figure 2.1 shows these demand relationships for a representative brand, namely 
brand 1.  Assume that demand curves are linear and the market is in equilibrium at P0 Q0.  
In addition, assume that the brand 1 firm decides to raise price to P1.  An increase in price 
yields a decline in quantity sold to Q1.   
 
 
 
    Price            Followship Demand 
                    Observed Demand 
   
     P1 
 
    P0         Non-followship Demand 
 
 
 0        QNF          Q1        QF      Q0   Quantity 
Figure 2.1  Followship, Non-Followship, and Observed Demand Curves 
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If there is perfectly tacit collusion among firms, the output will decline only to QF 
because the firm has market power to influence the market price and its rivals follow, and 
if there is no tacit collusion, the quantity demanded will decline to QNF implying that the 
firm does not have enough market power to affect the market price and no one follows.   
Rothschild (1942) introduced a theoretical measure of the degree of market power 
called the Rothschild Index (RI).  It is the slope of the non-followship demand curve 
divided by the slope of the followship demand curve. 
   RI     =  slope of NFD curve/slope of FD curve 
                                       and       0 ≤ RI ≤ 1. 
Under perfect competition the slope of NFD curve would be zero implying that a 
competitive firm has no control over price and no effect on its rivals.   If the NFD curve 
is identical to the FD curve, the RI will be equal to 1 implying that the demand curve is 
the market-wide demand curve of a monopolist.  From these two extreme cases using the 
measure of RI, we would be able to measure a degree of market power from an observed 
demand with the RI ranging from zero to one. 
Cotterill (1994) has modified the Rothschild Index (RI) to be more applicable by 
converting the slope of the NFD curve and FD curve into elasticities.   This approach 
leads to the use of econometric methods to measure the degree of market power in 
empirical research.  With respect to Figure 2.1, let ∆P be the change in price ( P1 – P0), 
∆QNFD equals the change in quantity sold (Q0 – QNF) on the NFD curve, and ∆QFD is the 
change in quantity sold (Q0 – QF) on the FD curve.   
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   RI =  
FD
NFD
Q
P
Q
P
∆
∆
∆
∆  
Assume that the going price and quantity are P0 and Q0 and that the elasticities of NFD 
curve and FD curve are calculated at this point.  Multiplying the numerator and 
denominator by 
0
0
P
Q . 
   RI   =  
0
0
0
0
P
Q
Q
P
P
Q
Q
P
FD
NFD
×∆
∆
×∆
∆
 
    =    
FD
NFD
η
η
1
1  
    =      
NFD
FD
η
η ,    
where NFDη  represents the non-followship demand elasticity and FDη  represents the 
followship demand elasticity.  This measure of RI using elasticities retains the same 
interpretation of market power as the RI did in terms of slopes.   If the market is perfectly 
competitive, NFDη  will be infinitely negative, and the RI will be equal to zero.   If NFDη is 
equal to FDη , the RI will be equal to one, meaning that the market has monopoly power. 
Baker and Breshnahan (1985) were the first to estimate the degree of market 
power in a differentiated oligopoly by combining demand analysis with industrial 
organization concepts.   Cotterill (1994) has extended the approach by developing a brand 
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level analysis of demand and market power based upon a more general theory.  He 
assumed that an industry is differentiated and that Bertrand competition occurs such that 
price is the strategic variable.  Then the demand for brand 1 in the n-brand industry is a 
function of its price and its rival’s prices, that is: 
            q1 = q1( p1, p2  . . . pn, D)      (2.1) 
where: 
q1 = the quantity of brand 1, 
pi = the price of brand i, i = 1,…, n, and 
D = a vector of demand shift variables. 
If we take the total derivative of this equation, with respect to p1, we will obtain 
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 ...
dp
dD
D
q
dp
dp
p
q
dp
dp
p
q
dp
dq
∂
∂++∂
∂+∂
∂= .    (2.2) 
Assuming that demand shift variables are constant, the last term in equation (2.2) is equal 
to zero.   Multiply equation (2.2) by 
1
1
q
p and use the chain rule to account for oligopolistic 
price interdependence (for example, the second term of the right hand side would be 
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
dp
dp
q
p
p
p
p
q ×××∂
∂ ).  Some algebraic manipulation results in the following formula 
for the observable price elasticity of demand: 
1
2
111
0
1 i
n
i
iεηηη ∑
=
+= ,        (2.3) 
where: 
 = observable price elasticity for brand 1, 01η
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 11η = partial-own price elasticity of demand, 
 i1η = firm 1’s cross-price elasticity with respect to pi (i≠1), and  
 = rivals’ price response elasticity or the conjectural price response of firm i with 
respect to firm 1’s price (i≠1).  
1iε
Equation (2.3) is interpreted as follows.  Brand 1’s observable price elasticity is 
composed of two elements, its partial own-price elasticity and its coordinated market 
power component.  The partial own-price elasticity of demand for brand 1 ( 11η ) 
represents the percentage change in quantity of brand 1 demanded in response to a 
percentage change in its own price when its competitors’ prices are held constant.  
Therefore, the partial own price elasticity of demand can be interpreted as the non-
followship demand elasticity, which measures the unilateral market power of the brand 
(Cotterill, 1994).  The coordinated market power component is the summation of 
products between brand 1’s cross price elasticities and its rivals’ price-response 
elasticities.  If there is tacit collusion among firms in a way that other brands follow a 
change in brand 1’s price, will be positive.  Assuming that all brands are substitutes, 
though not perfect, the cross price elasticities, 
1iε
i1η , are also positive.  If the price-response 
elasticities and the cross-price elasticities are not zero, yielding coordinated market 
power, the observable price elasticity in equation (2.3) will be less elastic than the partial 
own price elasticity.   The followship demand elasticity ( ) can be obtained by adding 
up the partial own-price elasticity and all cross-price elasticities assuming that all the 
are equal to one (full collusion), .  According to the fully collusive 
F
1η
1iε
n
i
i
F
2
1111
=
∑= ηηη +
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assumption, the followship demand elasticity is also called the fully collusive elasticity, 
which is used for the rest of this dissertation.  The RI measures a degree of unilateral 
market power because it compares the fully collusive elasticity ( ) and the non-
followship elasticity(
F
1η
11η ).  
0
1
F
1
η
η
11η
Cotterill (1994) introduced a second measure of observed market power called the 
O Index (OI).  The OI can be obtained by dividing the slope of the observed demand by 
the slope of the followship demand.  Developed the same way as the RI Index, the OI is 
         OI =    ,  and  0 ≤ RI ≤ OI ≤ 1. 
In perfect competition, the OI is zero because the partial own price elasticity or the non-
followship elasticity ( ) is infinitely negative (and so is the observable price elasticity), 
and there is no coordinated market power.  If the market is perfectly collusive, the 
observed demand elasticity will be equal to the fully collusive elasticity resulting in the 
OI equal to one.  Unlike the RI, the OI measures a degree of bilateral market power 
because the observed demand elasticity ( ) in the OI accounts for both unilateral and 
coordinated market power.  Moreover, since the observable price elasticity is less elastic 
than the partial own price elasticity, the OI of the observed demand is always greater than 
or equal to the RI.   The closer to one the OI is, the greater the degree of market power.   
0
1η
In addition, Cotterill (1994) presented a new measure of market power called the 
Chamberlin Quotient (CQ).   
CQ  = 1 –
OI
RI  = 1 – 
11
0
1
η
η  
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and   0 ≤ CQ ≤ 1. 
The CQ measures the fraction of market power of the observed demand due to tacit 
collusion.   The higher are levels of tacit collusion in a market, the lower is the observed 
demand elasticity ( ) than the partial own-price elasticity (01η 11η ), and, therefore, the 
higher the CQ.   
 
The Demand System 
In order to measure the degree of market power in any industry using the RI, OI, 
and CQ, the partial own- and cross-price elasticities, and price-response elasticities of 
each brand in the industry must be estimated.   In this study, the partial own- and cross-
price elasticities were estimated using the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand 
System (LA/AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), and the price-response 
elasticities were estimated using the Bertrand price reactions functions.   
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) first developed the Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS).  They listed the advantages of their system as follows: it gives an arbitrary first-
order approximation to any demand system; it satisfies the axioms of choice exactly; it 
aggregates perfectly over consumers; it has a functional form which is consistent with 
previous household budget data; it is simple to estimate in its linear approximate form; 
and it can be used to test the restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry.  Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980) noted that “although many of these desirable properties are possessed 
by one or other of the Rotterdam or translog models, neither possesses all of them 
simultaneously”.   Blanciforti and Green (1983) noted an additional desirable property 
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that “the AIDS is indirectly nonadditive, allowing consumption of one good to affect the 
marginal utility of another good; whereas the linear expenditure system (LES) is directly 
additive, implying independent marginal utilities”.  Therefore, the AIDS does not require 
the strict substitution limitations implied by the additive demand models such as LES 
(Blanciforti and Green, 1983).   While the AIDS has several desirable properties, it may 
be difficult to estimate.  This is because the AIDS is non-linear.   To simplify this 
problem, Deaton and Muellbauer suggested using a linear approximation.  Several studies 
have shown that the AIDS and LA/AIDS models are equivalent or superior to other 
common demand specifications, e.g., translog (Lewbel, 1989); Rotterdam (Gao, Wailes, 
and Cramer, 1994); and LES (Green, Hassan, and Johnson, 1995).   Because of their 
advantages, the AIDS and LA/AIDS models have been employed in both macro- and 
micro-demand analysis.  A list of studies that have used either the AIDS or the LA/AIDS 
or both to investigate consumer behavior in various food markets is presented in Table 
2.1.   
Deaton and Muellbauer start their approach by setting a specific class of 
preferences, which represents exact aggregation over consumers (Muellbauer, 1975), 
known as the price-independent, generalized-logarithmic (PIGLOG) consumer 
preferences.  The PIGLOG is represented through the consumer cost or expenditure 
function, which is defined as the minimum expenditure necessary to attain a specific 
utility level at given prices.  The PIGLOG class is defined as: 
log c(u, p) = (1 – u)log[a(p)] + u log[b(p)],    (2.4) 
where u denotes utility ranging from 0 to 1, p is a price vector, and a(p) and b(p) are 
linearly homogeneous functions of prices to be specified.  The expenditure function in  
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Table 2.1   Listing of Research on Food Product using the AIDS or LA/AIDS 
 
Auther 
(Published year) 
Research 
Time period 
System Objective 
Deaton and 
Muellbauer 
(1980) 
1954 – 1974  AIDS and 
LA/AIDS 
Estimation of demand for eight 
commodities in UK, and comparison 
between AIDS and LA/AIDS 
Blanciforti and 
Green (1982) 
1948 – 1978  AIDS and 
LA/AIDS 
Incorporation of habit effects in the 
system to estimate demand system 
Blanciforti and 
Green (1983) 
1948 – 1978  LES1 and 
LA/AIDS 
Estimation of demand for food groups 
and comparison between LES and 
LA/AIDS  
Chalfant (1987) 1947 – 1978  LA/AIDS Investigation of the demand for meat 
and fish products 
Lewbel (1989) 1955 – 1984  Translog and 
LA/AIDS 
Testing and comparison between the 
Translog and AIDS models  
Green, Carman, 
and McManus 
(1991) 
1957 – 1986  AIDS Estimation of advertising effects in 
demand for dried fruits 
Cotterill (1994) 1988 – 1990  LA/AIDS Estimation of market power in 
carbonated soft drink industry 
Gao, Wailes, and 
Cramer (1994) 
1987 – 1988  Rotterdam, 
CBS2, and 
LA/AIDS 
Estimation of demand for rice and its 
substitutes using several models 
Song, Liu, and 
Romilly (1997) 
1960 – 1988  WLS3, 
cointegration, 
error 
correction, 
AIDS, and 
TVP4 
Analysis on demand for food in the 
U.S. and the Netherlands, and 
comparison of various econometric 
methods 
Richards, Kagan, 
and Gao (1997)  
1970 – 1991  LA/AIDS Investigation of the demand for 
complex-carbohydrate products 
Henneberry, 
Piewthongngam, 
and Qiang (1999) 
1970 – 1992  LA/AIDS Estimation of demand functions for 
fresh fruits and vegeTables  
Vickner and 
Davies (1999) 
1994-1996 LA/AIDS Estimation of market power in 
spaghetti sauce industry 
Cotterill, Putsis, 
and Dhar (2000) 
1991 – 1992  LA/AIDS Analysis the competitive interaction 
between private labels and national 
brands on six individual categories 
Teisl, Roe, and 
Hicks (2000) 
1988 – 1995  AIDS Investigation of the dolphin-safe-label 
effect on the tuna demand  
1LES-Linear Expenditure System, 2 CBS- the Central Bureau of Statistics model, 3 WLS-
Weighted Least Squares, and 4 TVP-Time-Varying Parameter Technique 
 27 
equation (2.4) includes two components.  The expenditure log a(p) is interpreted as 
necessary expenditure, whereas the expenditure log b(p) is interpreted as luxury 
expenditure.   It can be shown that the expenditure function is increasing in utility and 
nondecreasing in prices.   
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) suggest the specific functional forms of log a(p) and log 
b(p) as: 
jiij
ji
ii pppaapa loglog2
1log)(log *0 γ∑∑+∑+=    (2.5) 
and  
 ,     (2.6) kk
k
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where ai, βi, and are parameters.   The cost function c(u, p) is linearly homogeneous in 
p given that .   
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By differentiating equation (2.4) with respect to prices and using Shepard’s Lemma, they 
obtain the compensated or Hicksian demand functions. 
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where w  is the market share of good i.  ),( pui
According to the cost function from equation (2.7), equation (2.9) becomes 
iw = ,     (2.10) kk
k
ijij
j
i pup
βββγφ ∏+∑+ 0log
where )( **21 jiijij γγγ += .       (2.11) 
Since total expenditure, Y , is equal to c  in equilibrium for a utility-maximizing 
consumer, by solving for u  (indirect utility) in terms of  and Y from equation (2.7), 
and substituting the result into equation (2.10), we obtain the AIDS in budget share form 
as: 
),( pu
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where P  is a price index defined by  
Plog  = a  + 0 jiij
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The translog price index in equation (2.13) causes some empirical problems.  First, its 
specification makes the AIDS a non-linear econometric model, and therefore, it is 
complicated to estimate the model (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980).  Second, the prices in 
equation (2.13) are likely to be highly correlated, and the high correlation among prices 
can cause collinearity problems.   However, Buse (1996) used the AIDS model to 
estimate meat consumption in the U.S. and concluded that the collinearity among prices 
in the AIDS model was not a serious problem as was presumed in the literature.  
Nevertheless, several studies have replaced the translog price index, log , by the Stone 
index, , where , and  is assumed to be approximately 
P
*log P ii pwP log*log ∑= *P
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proportional to P , such that , and w is the ith firm’s market share 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Chalfant, 1987; Cotterill, 1994; and Vickner and Davies, 
1999).  Therefore, by using the Stone index the AIDS has been termed the “linear 
approximate almost ideal demand system” (LA/AIDS).  Thus equation (2.12) becomes   
ePaP += 0* i
iP
Y ω+


*log
iβ

log
ij
j
ijii pw βγα ++= ∑ log ,    (2.14) 
where .  Using the Stone index makes the LA/AIDS in equation (2.14) a 
much simpler estimation problem.  This can be done by calculating the Stone index 
directly and then treating the total expenditure, 
0aii φα +=


*P
Y  in equation (2.14), as a 
predetermined variable before estimating equation (2.14) using OLS regressions (Deaton 
and Muellbauer, 1980).  Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) suggest that by using the Stone 
index, the model becomes linear in the parameters, and the estimation can be done 
equation by equation by OLS, which is equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation for 
the system as a whole.  Moreover, treating the Stone index as exogenous can reduce the 
collinearity problem (Chen, 1998).  Deaton and Muellbauer estimated an eight-
commodity demand system using aggregate annual UK data from 1954 to 1974 and 
concluded that there was no significant difference between the parameters obtained from 
the AIDS and the LA/AIDS.  Alston, Foster, and Green (1994) conducted Monte Carlo 
experiments to investigate whether the Stone index is a good approximation.  They 
concluded that “demand analysts can consequently have a certain degree of confidence 
when estimating the LA/AIDS”.   Therefore, the LA/AIDS model has been a popular tool 
for researchers in the analysis of both macro- and micro-demand system (Deaton and 
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Muellbauer, 1980; Blanciforti and Green, 1983; Chalfant, 1987; Cotterill, 1994; Asche, 
Bjorndal, and Salvanes, 1998; Henneberry, Piewthongngam, and Qiang, 1998; Vickner 
and Davies, 1999).   
Chalfant (1987) and Green and Alston (1990) suggested elasticity formulas that 
can be used with the parameters obtained from the LA/AIDS and the Stone index.  The 
formula of the partial own- and cross price elasticities of demand ( ijη ) suggested by 
Chalfant (1987), and Green and Alston (1990) is: 
j
i
i
i
ijk
ij
j
i
ij wwwPd
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ln
ln ,     (2.15) 
where is the Kronecker delta ( = 1 for i = j; =  0 for i ≠ j), and are 
average market shares of brand i and j, and and  are parameters estimated from the 
LA/AIDS.   Several studies used this elasticity formula in their work (Cotterill, 1994; 
Richards, Kagan, and Gao, 1997; Asche, Bjorndal, and salvanes, 1998; Henneberry, 
Piewthongngam, and Qiang, 1999, Vickner and Davies, 1999).  Alston, Foster, and Green 
(1994) conducted Monte Carlo experiments to investigate the appropriate formula to 
compute elasticities.  They found that equation (2.15) is quite accurate relative to 
alternatives because it is a reasonably good approximation to the true AIDS.  
k
ijδ kijδ kijδ iw jw
ijγ iβ
     The studies of Cotterill (1994), Vickner and Davies (1999), and Cotterill, Putsis, 
and Dhar (2000) are related to the first part of this dissertation.  They estimated the 
demand system using the LA/AIDS simultaneously with the supply system using price-
reaction functions.  In addition, they estimated the LA/AIDS using the Stone index.   
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It has been found that the Stone index can cause econometric problems.   
Pashardes (1993) examined the effect of using the Stone index by comparing analytical 
expressions and empirical findings obtained from the AIDS model with and without the 
Stone index approximation.  Pashardes found that the Stone index causes the parameter 
estimates to be biased.   Buse (1994) investigated the LA/AIDS using the Stone index and 
concluded that the seemingly unrelated estimator of the LA/AIDS was inconsistent.   
Another problem of using the Stone index is the units-of-measurement problem.   
According to the study of Cotterill, Putsis, and Dhar (2000), one assumption made in 
their price-reaction functions was that, in order to observe a manufacturer’s wholesale 
price (wi), the retailer’s price (Pi) is used as a proxy and assumed to be proportional to its 
wholesale price.  In other words, the wholesale price (wi) is scaled up by a constant 
number (m) to represent a proportional mark up rule of the retailer’s price decision, that 
is, Pi = mwi.   Moschini (1995) suggested caution in using the Stone price index in the 
LA/AIDS due to the units-of-measurement problem, such as when prices are scaled up.  
Due to Moschini’s work, the LA/AIDS model with scaled prices could be shown to be 
different from the original AIDS model, and thus the estimated parameters would 
generally be biased.  Moschini concluded that for the purpose of estimating the LA/AIDS 
model, “the standard Stone index should be avoided” (Moschini, 1995).  Moschini 
suggested that a price index should meet a desirable property in which an appropriate 
price index should be invariant to the units of measurement of prices.  This desirable 
property is called the commensurability property (Diewert, 1987; and Moschini, 1995).  
However, Moschini suggested that the units-of-measurement problem may be solved by 
using a price index that satisfies this property.  Moschini recommended several price 
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indices that may be used to maintain the specification of the AIDS linear and that satisfy 
the commensurability property.  The indices recommended by Moschini were the 
Tornqvist index, the corrected Stone index, and the Laspeyres price index. 
The Tornqvist index is written as: 
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The corrected Stone index is written as: 
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The Laspeyres price index is written as: 
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where the zero superscript denotes base period values, such as mean values. 
In a Monte Carlo experiment, Moschini found that the LA/AIDS could 
approximate the AIDS well when the recommended price indices were used. 
 
The Price-Reaction Functions 
The LA/AIDS gives only own- and cross-price elasticities.  In order to measure a 
firm’s market power using the indices mentioned above, the conjectural price responses 
or the price-response elasticities are needed.  The price-response elasticities can be 
obtained from the estimation of price-reaction functions.  A firm’s price reaction function 
is derived from the first order condition of the maximizing profit function of the firm, 
assuming that the market is characterized as Bertrand competition with differentiated 
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products and that price is the strategic choice variable.  Liang (1989) estimated demand 
functions and price-reaction functions simultaneously to measure the degree of market 
power in the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry.  The demand and supply functions in 
Liang’s work are linear.  Cotterill (1994) studied the degree of market power in the 
carbonated-soft drink industry.  He extended Liang’s linear price-reaction functions to the 
double-log specification, that is     
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where 
ip and = the prices of brand i and j,  jp
iC = the vector of shift variables of brand i, and  
ijφ  = the price-elasticity parameters to be estimated, for i, j = 1, 2, …, n.  
 
Previous Empirical Findings 
The empirical findings of Cotterill (1994), and Vickner and Davies (1999) are 
closely related to the first part of this study.  Cotterill (1994) applied Baker and 
Breshnahan’s (1985) demand approach and Liang’s price-reaction functions to his work.  
He analyzed the degree of market power in the carbonated soft drink industry using 
quarterly time-series scanner data from 1988 to 1990.  To investigate the demand-side of 
the market, he employed the LA/AIDS model in order to obtain the partial own and cross 
price elasticities of demand for each brand.  On the supply-side of the market, Cotterill 
used the first-order conditions derived from an oligopolist's profit-maximizing function, 
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assuming that the market is characterized by Bertrand competition, to estimate the price-
response elasticities or the conjectural price response.  He used error-components and 
three-stage least squares estimation methods to estimate both the LA/AIDS and price-
reaction functions simultaneously.  Cotterill used the RI, OI, and CQ to measure a 
brand’s degree of market power using the estimated partial own-price, cross-price and 
price-response elasticities.  Cotterill found that indices of Coke, Pepsi, Seven-Up and 
private labels behaved as expected.  As the RI and OI are close to one, the estimated 
brand is interpreted to have a high degree of market power.   The CQ measures the 
fraction of market power of the observed demand due to tacit collusion.  Coke, for 
example, was estimated to have the RI equal to .71 indicating a high level of unilateral 
market power.  Its OI was estimated to be equal to .84 showing a substantial amount of 
unilateral and coordinated market power, whereas its CQ was estimated to be equal to 
14.7 percent meaning that 14.7 percent of Coke’s market power is due to tacit collusion. 
Following Cotterill’s approach, Vickner and Davies (1999) estimated market 
power and pricing conduct in the domestic spaghetti sauce industry, a product-
differentiated oligopoly.   Vickner and Davies employed the simultaneous equations of 
the LA/AIDS model and the price-reaction functions to estimate the partial own- price 
and cross-price elasticities, and the price-response elasticities.  The estimates led to 
inferences that the own-price elasticities were statistically significant and negative, and 
that demand for each brand was elastic.  Their explanation for the elastic demands was 
that because the spaghetti sauce product was a durable good, consumers could stockpile 
the products when they were on sale.  On the supply side, the results supported Bertrand 
competition in that the estimated price-response elasticities were generally upward 
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sloping.  Following Cotterill’s study, Vickner and Davies measured the degree of market 
power by using the RI, OI, and CQ.  They found some evidence of market power in the 
spaghetti sauce industry even though the extent was not as high as in the carbonated soft 
drink industry estimated by Cotterill.   They also found that brands within a specific 
product category had high degree of tacit collusion.  They pointed out in their study that 
one firm in the industry was capable of maintaining its market power without tacit 
collusion due to an advantage on its niche in the market. 
The degree of market power is one of the crucial issues in industrial organization.   
Cotterill’s and Vickner and Davies’ work is one of several ways in which industrial 
organization economists have studied the degree of market power.  Other studies of the 
degree of market power, which used different approaches from this dissertation, include 
those of Appelbaum (1982), Schroeter (1988), Liang (1989) and Nevo (2001). 
  One alternative is to estimate the mark-up, the difference between price and 
marginal cost as a proportion of price, and is called the Lerner index.  To analyze the 
Lerner index, conjectural elasticity and price elasticity of demand have to be estimated 
because the Lerner index is positively related to the conjectural elasticity and inversely 
related to the elasticity of market demand.   Appelbaum (1982) investigated four U.S. 
manufacturing industries: textiles, rubber, electrical machinery, and tobacco.  Schroeter 
(1988) studied the beef packing industry.  A disadvantage of the Lerner index is the 
assumption of homogeneous products.  Therefore, the degree of market power among 
brands in an industry was not estimated.  The estimated Lerner index for each industry 
represented the degree of market power of that industry as a whole.    
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Liang (1989) estimated the degree of market power in a product-differentiated 
oligopoly, the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry on the national level.  Specifically, 
he examined price competition between pairs of ready-to-eat breakfast cereal products.  
The two brand demand functions and the two price-reaction functions were estimated 
simultaneously for each of the observed supermarkets using a nonlinear three stage least 
squares procedure.  Price reaction elasticities were obtained from the estimated price-
reaction functions, and the price conjectural variations were obtained from the estimated 
own- and cross-price elasticities of demand.  Liang’s findings suggested that prices in the 
ready-to-eat breakfast industry were highly non-competitive and the degree of pricing 
interdependence varied across the brand pairs.  The hypothesis of collusive pricing could 
not be rejected if a brand had close substitutes.  Conversely, a manufacturer was able to 
set price independently if its brand was found to be sufficiently differentiated from close 
substitutes.  The major advantage of his approach was that it showed the difference 
between market power ascribed to demand elasticities and market power ascribed to 
collusive pricing conduct.  A disadvantage of his study was that it estimated price 
competition between pairs of products.  In fact, strategic price interaction among all 
brands in the industry should be taken into account in the analysis. 
Nevo (2001) examined the nearly collusive-pricing behavior and intense non-
price competition in the ready-to-eat cereal industry by the estimation of price-cost 
margins.  Nevo used discrete choice models to estimate demand elasticities, which were 
used to compute price-cost margins.  Nevo concluded that observed high degrees of 
price-cost margins were due to product differentiation.  In addition, prices in the industry 
were consistent with non-collusive pricing behavior. 
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Chapter Three 
Data and Econometric Methodology  
  
An objective of this dissertation is to estimate the degree of market power in the 
canned tuna industry in a local market.   The data used in this dissertation are scanner 
data for the canned tuna industry collected from supermarkets in Knoxville, Tennessee.  
The model specification in this dissertation is different from previous studies (Cotterill, 
1994; and Vickner and Davies, 1999).  It uses the corrected Stone index in the estimation 
of LA/AIDS.  Estimates using the traditional Stone index are also generated and 
compared to those associated with the corrected Stone index.   This chapter starts with a 
discussion of the data and then outlines the empirical approach.   
 
Data 
The Use of Scanner Data 
This study uses weekly scanner data from the canned tuna industry to estimate 
firms’ market power.   Scanning systems were introduced during the mid-1970s, and they 
have become the industry standard.  Scanner data are primary data that represent a readily 
current and timely source of product-specific information including price, quantity, 
expenditure, and marketing activities such as coupons, retail advertising and shelf-space 
location for a large number of products available on a daily basis (Nayga, 1992).  
Eastwood (1993) mentioned that the retailer’s motivation for the introduction of scanners 
was primarily for time saving and more precision in the checkout process.  Eastwood 
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(1993) argued that scanner data have desirable properties.  First, the level of detail in 
scanner data allows researchers to examine relationships among close substitutes and 
complements.  Second, the time period is more consistent than traditional data sets.  
Third, the data can be obtained much more quickly than traditional data sets. Finally, they 
can be used to test various merchandising hypotheses under market conditions.   Thus, 
the scanner data are a non-traditional data source, which can be used in empirical 
research to investigate a product in terms of both demand and market structure.   
There are some weaknesses associated with the use of scanner data.  Capps and 
Nayga (1991) indicated that limitations of scanner data include the sheer volume of 
information, the lack of consumer socio-demographics, and the provision of information 
only for food eaten at home.  Eastwood (1993) addressed two problems in constructing 
scanner data sets for marketing and demand research.  The first problem involved 
classifying scanner data for variable-weight items into consumer demand categories.  The 
second problem focused on the creation of an advertising data set that can be combined 
with scanner data to evaluate market strategies.  Scanner data have been actively used in 
food marketing and economic research since the 1980s (Nayga, 1992).  A list of research 
in food demand using scanner data is presented in Table 3.1.  
There are some market research companies that process scanner data into a usable 
format for researchers, such as Information Resources, Incorporated (IRI), A.C. Nielsen, 
and Efficient Market Services.   The scanner data set used in this study is from IRI.  The 
company collects weekly scanner data from more than 32,000 supermarket, drug and 
mass merchandiser outlets across the United States.   Included in their data are sales, 
share, prices, and marketing variables for thousands of consumer brands sold.   
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Table 3.1  Listing of Research on Food Demand using Scanner Data 
Author 
(Published year)  
Research  
Time Period 
Objective 
Jensen and Schroeter 
(1992) 
1985 – 1987  Investigation of the TV advertising’s effects on 
beef demand 
Capps (1989) 1986 – 1987  Estimation of retail demand relationships for 
meat products 
Capps and Nayga 
(1990) 
1986 – 1988  Evaluation of effect of length of time on 
measured demand elasticities 
Capps and 
Lambregts (1991) 
1987 – 1988  Estimation of demand functions for finfish and 
shellfish products 
Eastwood, Brooker, 
and Gray (1994) 
1988 – 1991  Evaluation of effects of supermarket 
advertising on product sales 
Cotterill (1994) 1988 – 1990  Estimation of market power in carbonated soft 
drink industry 
Haller (1994) 1988 – 1992  Estimation of price strategies in the catsup and 
cottage cheese industries 
Wessells and 
Wallstrom (1999) 
1988 – 1992 
 
Testing the stability of canned salmon demand 
Jones (1997) 1990 – 1991 
 
Estimation of demand functions for breakfast 
cereal and carbohydrate products, and 
comparison on different income and location 
Seo and Capps 
(1997) 
1991 – 1992 
 
Estimation of regional variability of price and 
expenditure elasticities on spaghetti sauce 
products 
Cotterill, Putsis, and 
Dhar (2000) 
1991 – 1992 Analysis the competitive interaction between 
private labels and national brands on six 
individual categories 
Park and Senauer 
(1996) 
1994 Estimation of household brand-size choice 
models for spaghetti products 
Vickner and Davies 
(1999) 
1994 – 1996  Estimation of market power and pricing 
conduct in spaghetti sauce industry 
Vickner and Davies 
(2000) 
1994 – 1996  Estimation of strategic price-response on 
canned fruit industry 
Teisl, Roe, and 
Hicks (2000) 
1988 – 1995  Investigation of the dolphin-safe-label effect 
on the tuna demand 
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Several studies have used scanner data relying on the IRI data (Haller, 1994; 
Cotterill, 1994; Seo and Capps, 1997; Wessells and Wallstrom, 1999; and Vickner and 
Davies, 1999).   Cotterill (1994) suggested that scanner data were the most appropriate 
source of data to analyze both demand and strategic interactions.    
 Previous studies (Cotterill, 1994; and Vickner and Davies, 1999) estimated the 
degree of market power in oligopoly markets at the national level.  These studies have not 
captured market structure, pricing conduct, and demand at the local level.   Nayga (1992) 
suggested that scanner data from supermarkets in a particular location present a 
controlled situation.  The study of local market behavior would represent actual strategic 
interaction among firms precisely based on the actual local demand.  This dissertation has 
chosen Knoxville, Tennessee as a representative local market.   
The scanner data in this study were collected weekly by IRI for 157 weeks over 
the period of January 4, 1998 to December 31, 2000 from 134 supermarkets in Knoxville, 
Tennessee.   Supermarkets from which IRI collected the data in this city have annual 
sales of $2 million and above.  There is no information from IRI about individual 
supermarkets.  Therefore, each variable in the data set represents time series data 
aggregated from the 134 supermarkets, including Kroger, Food City and BI-LO.  Neither 
media advertising nor information about shoppers were available.  This study assumes 
that there was no change in the marketing of canned tuna by the store chains or the 
processors or in the socioeconomic characteristics of shoppers over the three year period.   
For each of the 157 weeks, the sales and price information for canned tuna are 
standardized to account for differences in size.   Package sizes and prices are converted 
into standardized 16-oz. equivalent units.   The data set from IRI indicates that there are 
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120 barcodes for canned tuna.   Aggregating sales by brand indicator, there are three 
leading brands that have total market shares that average over 80 percent of the market.  
These three leading brands are Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, and Bumble Bee.   Besides 
the three leaders, there are other canned tuna brands, each of which possesses a small 
fraction of market share.  Therefore, all other canned tuna brands are aggregated into a 
brand labeled Allother.   All variables are listed in Table 3.2, and their descriptions 
follow. 
 
Endogenous Variables 
There are two endogenous variables; the market share of brand i, , and the 
average price per unit of brand i, .  Brand i’s market share represents the percent of the 
brand’s total dollar sales of all brands in the market.   According to the LA/AIDS, this  
itw
ip
 
Table 3.2  Variables Used in the Estimation 
Variable Definition 
iw  Dollar share of brand i 
itp  Average price per 16-oz equivalent of brand i paid by the 
consumers at time t 
tY  Total expenditure spent on all brands of canned tuna in the 
market area at time t 
FEATUREit Percent of incremental volume sales for brand i sold in the 
presence of feature advertising only and no display at time t 
DISPLAYit Percent of incremental volume sales for brand i sold in the 
presence of display only and no feature advertising at time t 
FEATURE&DISPLAYit Percent of incremental volume sales for brand i sold in the 
presence of feature and display at time t 
REDUCTIONit Percent of incremental volume sales for brand i sold in the 
presence of price reduction only during at time t 
 i = Starkist, Bumble Bee, Chicken of the Sea, and Allother 
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variable is endogenous because it is determined by prices and total expenditure.  Prices of 
all package sizes and types of canned tuna (such as tuna in water and tuna in oil) of brand 
i are aggregated and weighted into the average price per 16-oz. equivalent of brand i. 
 
Explanatory variables 
 The total expenditure (Y ) is the total dollar expenditure spent on all brands of 
canned tuna in the market area during time t.  According to the LA/AIDS, the total 
expenditure in equilibrium is equal to a cost function (budget) of a utility-maximizing 
consumer.  The utility function associated with the LA/AIDS is weakly separable.  Weak 
separability allows for partitioning individual items into groups, which is consistent with 
two-stage budgeting.  That is, given weak separability, the consumers allocate income to 
various groups and given the allocation to subgroups, choices are made among the 
elements of the subgroups.  With respect to canned tuna, the consumer is envisioned as 
allocating expenditure to canned tuna and given the allocation, decides how much of the 
various brands to buy.  Therefore, the total expenditure on the canned tuna in the market 
is predetermined and set as exogenous variable.  The other exogenous variables are 
promotion-activity variables including the percent of incremental volume sales with the 
presence of feature only (FEATURE), the percent of incremental volume sales with the 
presence of display only (DISPLAY), the percent of incremental volume sales with feature 
and display (FEATURE&DISPLAY), and the percent of incremental volume sales with the 
presence of price reduction (PREDUCTION).    
t
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IRI collected and calculated each brand’s total volume sales, which are comprised 
of base sales and incremental sales.  Base sales are calculated by IRI using a proprietary 
model, which factors out promotional effects primarily by projecting volumes during 
non-promotional periods versus promotional periods.  Incremental sales are those sales 
which actually represent the effects of promotional activities.  Each brand’s promotional 
activities are assumed exogenous for the relatively short time period considered here.  
However, incremental sales from promotional activities of a brand are also included in 
the brand market share, which is an endogenous variable.  As a result, promotion-activity 
variables may have an endogeneity problem.  One remedy is to create dummy variables 
that indicate whether promotional activities are conducted or not.  However, this is not 
possible here because some canned tuna brands such as Starkist and Allother have 
promotional activities in at least one supermarket every week of the sample period.  
Another alternative is to drop the variables that cause the problem.  But this can cause 
another problem of omitted variable bias and model identification for the simultaneous 
equations and, therefore, should not be used here.  Several studies have used promotion-
activity variables collected by IRI as exogenous variables in their estimations (Cotterill, 
1994; Haller, 1994; Vickner and Davies, 1999, and Cotterill et al, 2000).  Because of the 
limitations of the available data and practically empirical difficulties, the promotion-
activity variables are treated as exogenous variables.  
A Feature is a retailer print advertisement that is used to promote a specific 
product or group of products.  Field auditors (supermarkets) record features appearing in 
newspapers, circulars and flyers.  The percent of incremental volume sales for brand i 
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sold in the presence of feature advertising only and no display during time t is calculated 
as:  
FEATUREit, = (Incremental volume sales of brand i in stores with feature only / Total 
volume sales of brand i) x 100.   
 A display is a temporary secondary location for a product in a store (i.e., in 
addition to its normal stocking location).  Displays are recorded by field auditors 
(supermarkets) who identify each display by its location and the UPCs that are in the 
display.  Field auditors monitor and record display activity in sample stores on a weekly 
basis. The general rule is that a secondary stocking unit must have at least 18 units of 
product in order to be considered a display.  The percent of incremental volume sales for 
brand i sold in the presence of display only and no feature advertising during time t is 
calculated as: 
DISPLAYit = (Incremental volume sales of brand i in stores with display only / Total 
volume sales of brand i) x 100.  
The percent of incremental volume sales for brand i sold in the presence of feature 
and display during time t is recorded by field auditors when features appearing in 
newspapers, circulars, flyers, and display activity are both conducted in the same week.  
This variable is calculated as: 
 FEATURE&DISPLAYit, = (Incremental volume sales of brand i in stores with feature and 
display / Total volume sales of brand i) x 100. 
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 Price reduction is a retailer promotional activity that is used to promote a specific 
product or group of products.  Prices of the products promoted are reduced below their 
regular prices and that it is monitored and recorded by field auditors on a weekly basis.  
The percent of incremental volume sales for brand i sold in the presence of price 
reduction only during time t is calculated as: 
REDUCTIONit = (Incremental volume sales of brand i in stores with price reduction only / 
Total volume sales of brand i) x 100.    
 
Econometric Methodology 
This section starts with the estimation of the simultaneous equations that contain 
the LA/AIDS and price reaction functions.  Next, partial own- and cross-price elasticities 
are calculated using the estimated parameters from the LA/AIDS.  Then, followship 
demand elasticities and observed price elasticities of demand for each brand are 
calculated.  Finally, the RI, OI, and CQ are estimated to measure the degree of market 
power of the canned tuna industry in Knoxville.   
 
Estimating Simultaneous Equations 
To estimate the LA/AIDS model, the Stone index and the Corrected Stone index 
time series must be generated.  This study first uses the corrected Stone index in the 
process of estimating the degree of market power.  Then, the traditional Stone index is 
used later with the same process for comparison.  The corrected Stone index suggested by 
Moschini (1995) is specified as: 
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where  
itp = the price of the ith brand at time t, 
0
ip = the average price of the ith brand over the time period, 
itw = the share of the ith brand at time t, and 
subscript i = Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, Bumble Bee, and Allother. 
Next, the expenditure (Y ) on all brands at time t weighted by the corrected Stone index 
at time t is calculated.   In the estimation of the LA/AIDS, the weighted expenditure (Y ) 
is treated as a predetermined variable.  Blanciforti and Green (1983) noted the use of the 
price index considerably simplifies the estimation procedure but not without some cost.  
If the Stone index is not treated as exogenous, the dependent variable,w , will appear on 
both sides of the LA/AIDS and the resulting estimators will not necessarily possess 
desirable sampling properties.  However, if the Stone index was not treated exogenously, 
the possible bias would be small because the term w  was weighted by
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is a fraction.  Following Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), all previous studies that used the 
Stone index in their LA/AIDS estimations ignored this econometric problem and treated 
the Stone index exogenously in obtaining parameter estimates.   In addition, each price 
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variable is normalized by its mean.   Asche and Wessells (1997) noted that if prices are 
normalized to one, the use of the elasticity formula suggested by Chalfant (1987), and 
Green and Alston (1990) is valid in both the AIDS and LA/AIDS.  
In equation (2.12), demand shift variables (Dit), such as promotional effects, can 
be incorporated into the model (Heien and Pompelli, 1988; and Asche, Bjorndal, and 
Salvanes, 1998) by allowing the intercept ( ) to be a function of them, that is 
.          
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By including demand shift variables and normalizing all prices, the LA/AIDS can be 
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and the price reaction function is specified as: 
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where  
,,, ijkii γδα ,, miij λφ ,  and = parameters to be estimated,  iβ
jtp = the price of brand  j at time t,  
itC = a vector of supply shift variables of brand i at time t,  
0
jp  = the mean value of the j
th  price series,  
tY = the total expenditure on canned tuna in the market weighted by the corrected stone 
index at time t, and 
i and j = Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, Bumble Bee, and Allother. 
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There are three sets of restrictions implied by economic theory imposed on the 
parameters of the system (in the LA/AIDS): 
Adding up: ,  , and          (3.5) 1*4 1 =∑ = ii α 04 1 =∑ = iji γ 04 1 =∑ = ii β
Homogeneity:     j     (3.6) 0=∑ ijj γ ∀
Symmetry:    ∀   i ≠ .    (3.7) jiij γγ = j
The adding up condition of the LA/AIDS model is satisfied by the data since 
 (Asche, Bjorndal, and Salvanes, 1997).  Therefore, for four demand equations 
only three demand equations of the leading firms (Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, and 
Bumble Bee) are estimated, and then the parameter estimates for the fourth equation 
(Allother) are generated from them.   Thus, in this study the simultaneous equations 
include three demand equations and four price reaction functions with seven endogenous 
variables.    
1=∑ iw
The LA/AIDS and the price reaction functions are estimated simultaneously with 
brand market shares (w ) and prices ( ) as endogenous variables.  The demand shift 
vector D
i ip
i captures brand i retail promotion activities.   These activities include the percent 
of incremental volume sales with the presence of display only (DISPLAY), the percent of 
incremental volume with feature only (FEATURE), the percent of incremental volume sales 
with the presence of both feature and display (FEATURE&DISPLAY), and the percent of 
incremental volume with the presence of price reduction (REDUCTION).  That is Di 
{FEATURE≡ i, DISPLAYi, FEATURE&DISPLAYi, REDUCTIONi}. 
Several assumptions are made in order to estimate the price reaction functions.   
No change in the cost structure of both manufacturers and retailers is assumed to have 
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occurred over the three year period.  No change in production technology among canned 
tuna processors is assumed to have taken place.  In addition, changes in the prices of 
inputs for the production of canned tuna affect firms similarly.  Finally, no principal-
agent problem between the food producers and the retailers is assumed to exist, implying 
that the manufacture-retail price margin was constant for each firm. Consequently, all 
variations in price were attributed to brands’ pricing strategies.  The shift variables (C ) 
in the price reaction functions include total expenditure (Y ), brand i’s market share (w ) 
and its promotional activities (D
i
i
i). 
The simultaneous system contains three demand equations and four price reaction 
equations.   The simultaneous system is identified by both order and rank conditions.   
Since the demand and price equations are assumed to take place simultaneously based on 
the Bertrand competition assumption, correlations of the disturbances across equations 
could be present; therefore the three-stage least squares method (3SLS) is selected to 
estimate the simultaneous equations.  
With respect to 3SLS, the first stage starts with the regression of each endogenous 
variable on the right hand side of each equation on all predetermined variables in the 
model and obtains the estimated values of the endogenous variables.  For the second 
stage, the structural model is estimated using ordinary least squares method and the 
endogenous variables on the right hand side of the model are replaced by the estimated 
values obtained from the first stage.    The third stage takes into account the correlation of 
the disturbances across equations.  A variance-covariance matrix is obtained by using the 
two-stage least squares residuals from the second stage.  Then, the Aitken generalized 
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least squares (GLS) estimation is applied to the structural equations using the variance-
covariance matrix.    
The simultaneous equations are able to be estimated using 3SLS based on the 
assumption that the structural error terms are homoskedastic and not autocorrelated.  
However, when the observations are collected over time, the error terms are likely to be 
autocorrelated.  Blanciforti, Green and King (1986) found evidence of serial correlation 
in the AIDS models of aggregate food groups.  Yen and Chern (1992) estimated a 
flexible demand system with correction for autocorrelation and compared results with 
those obtained from the Translog and AIDS models.  They concluded that correcting 
serial correlation in demand system modeling was important.  Heteroskedasticity is 
normally encountered when dealing with micro economic data “but not when dealing 
with aggregates observed over time unless the time period covered is very long” 
(Kmenta, 1986).  Because the scanner data used in this study were collected in the same 
geographical area and for the same supermarkets over the three-year period, 
heteroskedasticity might be encountered.  Residuals that violate the assumption of no 
autocorrelation and homoskedasticity are called nonspherical.  Estimation of models with 
nonsperical residuals yields estimated variances that are inconsistent.  As a result, the 
standard tests of significance and confidence intervals are not valid.  Therefore, it is 
important to test the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems for each equation in 
the system.   
The Breusch-Pagan test is employed to test heteroskedasticity, and the sample 
correlogram and Ljung-Box statistics (L-B statistics) are used to test for autocorrelation.  
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Specifically, the L-B statistics tests whether autocorrelation exists, and the sample 
correlogram approximately indicates the order of autocorrelation.   
If heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation are found, the simultaneous equations 
are estimated using an improved estimation method called weighted three-stage least 
squares (W3SLS).  The W3SLS method can remedy the autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity problems.  The method is asymptotically efficient and gives consistent 
estimates of both estimated parameters and their variance-covariance matrix (Kmenta, 
1986).    The procedures of the W3SLS are as follows. 
Step 1: Each regression equation is estimated using the two-stage least squares method in 
order to obtain the regression residuals.  All explanatory variables are used as 
instrumental variables. 
Step 2: The regression residuals are tested for autocorrelation using sample correlogram 
and Ljung-Box statistics (L-B statistics) and for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-
Pagan test.   
Step 3: If autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity are found, each equation is weighted 
by a transformation matrix.  Each equation’s transformation matrix is constructed based 
on the Aitken generalized least squares (GLS) method.  In other words, if a variance-
covariance matrix (Ω ) of an equation is not equal to , that is E(e ) , i and j = 
1, 2,…, n, a transformation matrix (P) can be constructed such thatP or 
. 
I2σ jie ijσ=
′P 1−Ω=
IPP =′Ω
Step 4:  Each regression equation is pre-multiplied (i.e., weighted) by its transformation 
matrix in order to get a transformed equation.   
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Step 5: All transformed equations are then estimated simultaneously using 3SLS. 
 
Calculating Demand Elasticities 
The parameter estimates obtained from the LA/AIDS are used to calculate partial 
own- and cross-price elasticities, whereas price-response elasticities are obtained directly 
from the parameter estimates from the price-reaction functions.  The formula of the 
partial own- and cross-price elasticities of demand ( ijη ) suggested by Chalfant (1987), 
and Green and Alston (1990) is: 
j
i
i
i
ijk
ij
j
i
ij wwwPd
Qd βγδη −+−==
ln
ln ,      (3.11) 
where is the Kronecker delta ( = 1 for i = j; = 0 for i ≠ j), w and w are average 
market shares of brand i and j, and and  are parameters estimated from the 
LA/AIDS (i, j = Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, Bumble Bee, and Allother).   Alston, Foster, 
and Green (1994) conducted Monte Carlo experiments to investigate the appropriate 
formula to compute elasticities from the LA/AIDS.  They found that the formula in 
equation (3.11) is quite accurate relative to alternatives since it is a reasonably good 
approximation to the true AIDS.  
k
ijδ kijδ kijδ
iβ
i j
ijγ
 Following Chalfant (1987) and Cotterill (1994), standard errors of the partial 
own- and cross-price elasticities, SE( ijη ), are computed based on the standard errors of 
the estimated parameters and the average budget shares  that are treated as nonstochastic.  
The standard errors are computed as: 
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 SE( ijη ) = j
i
i
i
ij w
w
SE
w
SE )()( βγ − ,    (3.12) 
where and are standard errors of the estimated parameters from the 
LA/AIDS, and w and w are average market shares of brand i and j. 
)( ijSE γ iSE β(
j
)
i
 
Calculating Followship Demand Elasticities and Observed Demand Elasticities 
After obtaining partial own- and cross-price elasticities, the fully collusive 
elasticity and the observed demand elasticity of each brand are calculated.  The fully 
collusive elasticity of brand i, , can be obtained by adding up its partial own-price 
elasticity (
F
iη
iiη ) and all cross-price elasticities ( ijji ≠,η ) assuming that all price-response 
elasticities are equal to one (full collusion), .  The observed demand 
elasticity of brand i, , is defined as , where  represents rivals’ 
price-response elasticity or the conjectural price-response of firm j with respect to firm i’s 
price (i≠j).  The non-followship demand elasticity of brand i is its partial own-price 
elasticity (
n
ji
ij
≠
∑+ η
jiijεηη
ii
F
i = ηη
n
ji
ii ∑
≠
+0iη iη =0 jiε
iiη ).   
 
Calculating Measures of the Degree of Market Power 
 The degree of market power of brands in the canned tuna industry is measured by 
the Rothschild and O indices, and the Chamberlin Quotient.  Fully collusive elasticities 
and observable demand elasticities are used to calculate these measures. 
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The Rothschild Index (RI) is specified as:  RIi =  
ii
F
i
η
η   (3.13) 
where  represents the fully collusive elasticity of brand i, and Fiη iiη  represents the non-
followship demand elasticity of brand i or its own-price elasticity. 
The O Index is specified (OI) as:  OIi  =    0
i
F
i
η
η ,    (3.14) 
where represents the observable elasticity of demand for brand i. 0iη
The Chamberlin Quotient (CQ) is specified as: CQi = 1 –
i
i
OI
RI .  (3.15) 
 
Re-estimating Using the Stone Index 
In order to see the empirical magnitude of the corrected version of the Stone 
index, this study re-estimates the simultaneous equations using the Stone index in the 
LA/AIDS, and then calculates the RI, OI, and CQ to compare the differences. 
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Chapter Four 
Estimation and Results 
 
 This chapter starts with a statistical description of the scanner data for the canned 
tuna industry used in the estimation.  Building on the empirical model developed in the 
previous chapters, it presents the estimation of the simultaneous equations with the 
corrected Stone index in the LA/AIDS and remedies autocorrelation.  Weighted three-
stage least squares are used for the final estimates of the model.  The estimated 
parameters obtained from the LA/AIDS are used to calculate partial own- and cross-price 
elasticities.  Next, the RI, OI, and CQ are calculated to measure the degree of market 
power of each brand using the partial own-price and cross-price elasticities, and price-
response elasticities obtained from the estimation.  The estimated price-reaction functions 
are analyzed for strategic price responses among brands in the industry.  Finally, the 
process of estimating the degree of market power is repeated with the use of the 
traditional Stone index in the LA/AIDS, and the results are compared.    
 
Data Description 
Weekly scanner data for canned tuna industry were collected by IRI for 157 
weeks over the period of January 4, 1998 to December 31, 2000 from 134 supermarkets 
in Knoxville, Tennessee.  There are four brands, Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, Bumble 
Bee, and Allother.  Descriptive statistics for all variables and brands are presented in 
Table 4.1.   
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Table 4.1  Descriptive Statistics for Canned Tuna: 1998 – 2000 (157 weekly observations) 
 
Variable   Mean        Standard Deviation   Min  Max 
Share (wi): 
  Starkist   0.666      0.059   0.415  0.823 
  Chicken of the Sea  0.146      0.036   0.071  0.316 
  Bumble Bee   0.048      0.015   0.023  0.144 
  Allother   0.139      0.048   0.061  0.343 
Price (Pi): 
  Starkist   0.915      0.081   0.633  1.126 
  Chicken of the Sea  0.987      0.146   0.487  1.248 
  Bumble Bee   0.963      0.167   0.428  1.288 
  Allother   0.686      0.060   0.450  0.798 
% Volume in Feature Ads only (Featurei): 
  Starkist   8.533      10.712  0.067  48.046 
  Chicken of the Sea  3.526      10.258  0.037  73.875 
  Bumble Bee   5.012      13.183  4.018  64.099 
  Allother   8.723      17.107  0.864  70.108 
% Volume on Display only (Displayi): 
  Starkist   15.242      9.980   0.499  50.009 
  Chicken of the Sea  2.350      4.826   0.727  32.264 
  Bumble Bee   6.137      9.432   0.100  49.273 
  Allother   14.959     14.082   0.666  63.366 
% Volume on Feature and Display (Feature and Displayi): 
  Starkist   10.291     12.127   1.347  62.497 
  Chicken of the Sea  3.614     10.222   2.089  54.276 
  Bumble Bee   3.922     14.191   7.107  80.696 
  Allother   7.413     15.193   0.880  65.874 
% volume on Price Reduction (Reductioni): 
  Starkist   7.635      5.807   0.809  33.629 
  Chicken of the Sea  13.464      11.606  0.185  54.854 
  Bumble Bee   17.347      15.808  0.012  63.536 
  Allother   11.154      12.401  0.053  49.954 
Total Expenditure (Y )  28845.11     4372.3           15973.69               50266.57 t
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Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, and Bumble Bee are the three leading brands, which 
had average combined market shares of about 86 percent of the canned tuna sales in 
Knoxville area.   Starkist’s average market share was 66.6%, the highest in the industry.  
For Chicken of the sea, Bumble Bee and Allother, their market average shares were 
14.6%, 4.8%, and 13.9% respectively.  Chicken of the Sea had the highest average price 
per unit ($0.99/unit), whereas the average price of Allother was the lowest ($0.69/unit).   
Table 4.2 compares the canned tuna market shares between Knoxville market and 
the U.S. market in 2000.  The three leading brands’ market share (CR3) at the national 
level was 82 percent lower than those in Knoxville market (85%).  Starkist seemed to be 
a popular brand in Knoxville market since its market share was 64 percent compared to 
only 40% at the national level; however it was the leader in both market levels.  
Interestingly, Bumble Bee had higher market share (22%) than Chicken of the Sea (20%) 
at the national level, whereas its market share in Knoxville (5%) was lower than those of 
Chicken of the Sea (16%).  The market share of Allother in Knoxville (15%) was very 
close to those for the whole country (16%). 
 
Table 4.2  Comparing Market Shares between Knoxville and U.S. markets in 2000 
Brand         Knoxville Market          U.S. Market* 
Starkist       64         40 
Chicken of the Sea      16         20 
Bumble Bee         5             22 
Allother       15         16 
*Source: US Business Reporter, available at http://www.activemedia-guide.com/mrksh_profile.htm    
 
 58 
With respect to promotional activities, Starkist was the most successful brand in 
the presence of feature advertising and display.  It had the highest average percentage of 
total volume sales in the presence of display (15.24%), and display and feature together 
(10.29%).  Starkist was the only brand that offered price reductions every week during 
the observation period in at least one supermarket.  However, its average percentage of 
total sales in the price reduction category was only 7.64%.  Bumble Bee had the highest 
average percentage of total sales (17.35%) when it reduced its price.   However, to 
analyze how successful a brand was when it had a price reduction, the brand’s price 
elasticity of demand should be taken into account.  Finally, the average total expenditure 
spent on all canned tuna brands within a week in Knoxville market was $28845.11.  
 
  
Estimation Results 
Simultaneous Equations  
 
 The simultaneous equations in this dissertation contain the LA/AIDS and price-
reaction functions. The LA/AIDS is specified as: 
itc
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j
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and the price reaction function is: 
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4
1,
0 loglog ,                (4.2) 
where  
itw  = the market share of good i at time t,  
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itp and = the price of brand i and j at time t,  jtp
0
jp  =  the mean value of the j
th  price series,  
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pwP  =  the corrected Stone index, 
tY   =   the total expenditure on the canned tuna in the market weighted by the corrected 
stone index at time t, 
itD  =  a vector of demand shift variables of brand I at time t {FEATURE≡ i, DISPLAYi, 
FEATURE&DISPLAYi, REDUCTIONi}, 
itC =  a vector of supply shift variables of brand i at time t {w , Y , and D≡ i i}, 
,,, ijkii γδα ,, kiij λφ , and = parameters to be estimated, and iβ
i = Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, Bumble Bee, and Allother. 
The LA/AIDS contains three equations (the demand equations of Starkist, Chicken of the 
Sea, and Bumble Bee with the demand equation of Allother being dropped) and four price 
reaction equations. 
 
Testing for Heteroskedasticity 
 The Breusch-Pagan test is employed to detect heteroskedasticity for each 
equation.  The test is based on the assumption that the variance ( ) of each disturbance 
term, , is a linear function of some explanatory variable.  Therefore, it is not constant 
over time depending on the variation of the related explanatory variable.  The explanatory 
variables in this dissertation include total expenditure, and promotional activities, which 
2σ
iε
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are collected from 134 supermarkets.  Although there are differences in size of 
supermarkets, the data are aggregated and collected from the same supermarkets during 
the time period.  The data are treated like a representative supermarket.  Thus, the 
regression variances seem to be constant over the time period.  Nonetheless, tests for 
heteroskedasticity are conducted to be sure that there is no such problem involved in the 
estimation.  According to the Breusch-Pagan test, explanatory variables that are 
suspected to cause heteroskedasticity are selected.  In this study, the total expenditure 
variable (Yt), which represents consumers’ total budgets spent on all canned tuna brands, 
is selected.  The test is done as follows. 
1. Regress each equation using 2SLS in order to obtain its regression residuals (e ). t
2. Calculate a maximum likelihood estimator of , , where 2σ ∧2σ net22 Σ=
∧σ .  
3. Construct a variable such that .    tf
∧
= 22 /σtt ef
4. Estimate equation f  to obtain the sum square of regression (SSR). tt Ybb 21 +=
5. The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is tested based on the Chi-square 
statistic.  That is QBP = SSR/2 ~   (degree of freedom = 1).   21χ
The test results are shown in Table 4.3.   The null hypotheses of homoskedasticity 
for all equations in the system cannot be rejected at the 1% level of significance.  The test 
results imply that heteroskedasticity is not likely to occur in the estimation. 
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Table 4.3  Heteroskedasticity Test  Results  
Equation        QBP             [Prob ( 6.64) = 0.01] >21χ
Demand Starkist                  1.68    
Demand Chicken of the Sea        3.60 
Demand Bumble Bee                0.01 
Price reaction Starkist        6.25 
Price reaction Chicken of the Sea               3.02 
Price reaction Bumble Bee               2.89 
Price reaction Allother               3.95 
 
 
Testing for Autocorrelation 
 Since the observations comprise a time series, the residuals of each equation in 
the model are potentially autocorrelated.  The process of testing for autocorrelation is 
started by regressing each equation using the 2SLS method in order to obtain regression 
residuals.  Each equation’s residuals are tested for autocorrelation by using a sample 
correlogram and Ljung-Box statistic (L-B statistic).  The L-B statistic tests whether 
autocorrelation exists and the sample correlogram approximately indicates the order of 
autocorrelation.  The results from the L-B test indicate that all seven equations have 
autocorrelation.  According to sample correlograms, six out of seven equations are 
suspected to be first-order autoregressive (AR1), whereas one equation (Chicken of the 
Sea’s price reaction function) is likely to be second-order auto regressive (AR2).     
The regression residuals of each equation are then regressed on their lagged 
values.  The residuals of Chicken of the Sea’s price reaction function are regressed on 
their two period lags, whereas those of the other equations are regressed on their one 
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period lag.  Mathematically, e , where e  is the residual of equation i 
at time t, t = 2,…, n , s = number of time lagged, s = 1 and 2, and u are interdependent 
and identically distributed with zero mean and variance .  The estimated coefficients 
(ρ
itsit
s
isit ue += −
=
∑2
1
ρ it
2
uσ
it
is) are presented in Table 4.4.  All the estimated coefficients are statistically significant. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that all equations are AR1 except for the price reaction 
function of Chicken of the Sea that is AR2.  The estimated autoregressive coefficients 
shown in Table 4.4 are used to form a transformation matrix for use in W3SLS. 
 
Estimation of W3SLS 
According to Table 4.4, each equation in the simultaneous model is found to have 
autocorrelation.   This study uses W3SLS to correct the problem.  The estimated  
 
Table 4.4  Estimated Autoregressive Coefficients 
Equation        ρ1              ρ2    
Demand S            0.263***        -    
Demand C            0.507***   -    
Demand B            0.306***   -    
Price reaction S           0.282***   -    
Price reaction C           0.419***          0.1936**    
Price reaction B           0.282***   -    
Price reaction A           0.308***   -    
*** Significance at the 1% level, *** significance at the 5% level. 
Subscript: S = Starkist, C = Chicken of the Sea, B = Bumble Bee, and A = Allother. 
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coefficients ( ) in Table 4.4 are used to form a transformation matrix for each 
regression equation.  After pre-multiplying each equation by its transformation matrix, 
the transformed equations are estimated simultaneously using 3SLS.  The estimated 
parameters of the LA/AIDS are reported in Table 4.5.   Significant estimated parameters 
in Table 4.5 are used to calculate own- and cross-price elasticities of demand for each 
brand.   
isρ
According to the adding up condition, only three demand equations of Starkist, 
Chicken of the Sea, and Bumble Bee are estimated, and then the parameter estimates for 
the Allother demand equation ( and ) are generated from them.  The effect of each 
brand’s price on its share is negative and statistically significant.  Prices of Chicken of the 
Sea and Allother have positive effects on Starkist’s market share.   Prices of Starkist and 
Allother also have positive effects on Chicken of the Sea’s market share, but only the 
price of Allother has positive effects on Bumble Bee’s market share.  The positive effect 
of a brand’s price on another brand’s market share is reasonable.  When a brand increases 
its price and the other brands do not follow, consumers may switch to buy a substitute, 
resulting in an increase in the substitute brand’s market share.  Bumble Bee’s price in 
both Chicken of the Sea’s and Starkist’s equations is not statistically significant implying 
that a change in Bumble Bee’s price has no effect on those two brands’ shares.  Total 
expenditure weighted by the corrected Stone index is statistically significant and has 
negative effects on Starkist’ and Bumble Bee’s market shares.  With respect to Starkist’s 
promotional activities, DISPLAY, FEATURE, and DISPLAY&FEATURE are statistically 
significant and have positive effects on Starkist’s share, even though the magnitudes are 
AAγ Aβ
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Table 4.5  Estimation of the LA/AIDS model  
        ShareStarkist   ShareChicken of the Sea  ShareBumble Bee 
Intercept           1.526    0.015    0.284 
  (0.307)**   (0.163)    (0.064)** 
 
PStarkist    -0.503    0.196    0.010 
  (0.072) **   (0.025)**   (0.013) 
 
PChicken of the Sea 0.196    -0.261    -0.001 
  (0.025)**   (0.024)**   (0.007) 
 
PBumble Bee 0.010    -0.001    -0.035 
  (0.013)    (0.007)    (0.014)** 
 
PAllother  0.297    0.065    0.026 
  (0.064)**   (0.030)*   (0.014)* 
 
Y/P*  -0.088    0.015    -0.023 
  (0.030)**   (0.016)    (0.006)** 
 
DISPLAY 0.002    -0.002    0.000 
  (0.000)**   (0.000)**   (0.000) 
 
FEATURE 0.001    0.000    0.000 
  (0.000)**   (0.000)    (0.000) 
 
DISPLAY& 
FEATURE 0.001    -0.001    0.001 
  (0.000)*   (0.000)**   (0.000)** 
 
PRICE 
REDUCTION -0.001    -0.001    -0.000 
  (0.000)    (0.000)**   (0.000) 
 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.6684, Standard errors in parentheses,   
* = Significance at 5% level, and   * * = significance at 1% level  
According to the adding up condition,  = -0.388 and = 0.096. AAγ Aβ
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not high.  DISPLAY&FEATURE and PRICE REDUCTION have significant negative effects 
on Chicken of the Sea’s market share.   
The homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are imposed in the estimation: 
Homogeneity:     j, and    (4.3) 0=∑ ijj γ ∀
Symmetry:    ∀   i ≠ .    (4.4)  jiij γγ = j
The restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry are tested using an F test.   This 
test is based on the null hypothesis that the sample information is consistent with the 
imposed restrictions.  In other words, if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, it implies 
that the error structure of the respective unrestricted model do not differ from that of the 
restricted model.  If the null hypothesis is rejected, it implies that the imposed restrictions 
are not supported by sample information.  The computed F statistic of the imposed 
restrictions are presented in Table 4.6 
 The computed F in Table 4.6 shows that the null hypotheses of the homogeneity 
restrictions on Starkist and Chicken of the Sea demand equations cannot be rejected at 
1%.   The null hypothesis of symmetry restriction between Starkist and Bumble Bee 
demand equations cannot be rejected at 1% level of significance.   For the other two 
symmetry restrictions, the null hypotheses are rejected.   The results imply that the data 
used in this dissertation seem to be consistent with the homogeneity restrictions; however 
the data support only one symmetry restriction.  Several studies of food demand have 
also rejected the symmetry restriction.  A list of studies in food demand that imposed 
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions in the LA/AIDS is shown in Table 4.7.   Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980) estimated the LA/AIDS on eight nondurable goods using annual  
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Table 4.6    Test Results for Imposed Restrictions 
Property          Restriction         Computed F statistic  
    
Homogeneity                0.02 ∑
=
4
1j
Sjγ
Homogeneity                0.01 ∑
=
4
1j
Cjγ
Homogeneity                22.39∑
=
4
1j
Bjγ ** 
Symmetry       27.11CSSC γγ = ** 
Symmetry       4.90BSSB γγ =  
Symmetry       26.94CBBC γγ = ** 
**Significance at the 1% level,  subscript: S = Starkist, C = Chicken of the Sea, B = Bumble Bee, 
and A = Allother.  j = Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, Bumble Bee, and Allother. 
 
 
 
Table 4.7   Listing of Research on Food Product That Imposed Restrictions on the 
      LA/AIDS 
Auther     (Published year) Homogeneity Symmetry 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) Rejected Rejected 
Blanciforti and Green (1982) Rejected - 
Blanciforti and Green (1983) Rejected - 
Chalfant (1987) Not reported Not reported 
Green, Carman, and McManus (1991) Rejected Rejected 
Cotterill (1994) Not reported Not reported 
Richards, Kagan, and Gao (1997) Not rejected Not rejected 
Vickner and Davies (1999) Rejecteda Rejecteda 
Cotterill, Putsis, and Dhar (2000) Not reported Not reported 
- means the restriction was not imposed.  a partially rejected in the EC3SLS 
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British data and found that symmetry restriction was rejected.   Green, Carman, and 
McManus (1991) found that homogeneity and symmetry conditions were strongly 
rejected in the estimation of demand on dried fruits.  Satyanarayana et al (1999) found 
rejection of symmetry in the estimation of demand for malt using the LA/AIDS.   Vickner 
and Davies (1999) estimated the degree of market power in the spaghetti sauce industry 
and found that in their error-components 3SLS (EC3SLS) estimation six of the ten 
symmetry restrictions on the LA/AIDS were rejected.  However, they used the parameter 
estimates from model with the imposed restrictions.   Since the results from testing the 
restrictions are consistent with those found in previous studies, the estimated results from 
the LA/AIDS in this study are reported with the restrictions imposed.  
 
Partial Own- and Cross- Price Elasticities   
Before calculating the RI, OI, and CQ, partial own- and cross-price elasticities, 
and price-response elasticities are needed.  The parameter estimates obtained from the 
LA/AIDS shown in Table 4.5 are used to calculate partial own- and cross-price 
elasticities of demand for each brand, and price-response elasticities are obtained directly 
from the parameter estimates from the price-reaction functions of the simultaneous 
model.    
The partial own- and cross-price elasticities of demand are shown in Table 4.8.  
The partial own- and cross-price elasticities of demand for brand Allother in Table 4.8 are 
calculated using parameter estimates derived from the adding up restrictions.  Therefore, 
the tests of significance for these elasticities are not shown in the Table.  The own-price 
elasticity of demand for each brand is found along the diagonal of the Table.  All brands’  
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Table 4.8   Partial Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities 
 
                % ∆ Price 
                                    Starkist Chicken of the Sea  Bumble Bee Allother 
 
Starkist  -1.67***               0.31***      0.02   0.46*** 
 
Chicken of the Sea 1.27***                    -2.80***    -0.01  0.43** 
 
Bumble Bee  0.51**           0.06    -1.71*** 0.61** 
 
Allother  1.68           0.37    0.15  -3.89 
 
Elasticities are read from left to right;  
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level. 
 
own-price elasticities are negative and elastic.  The partial own-price elasticity of demand 
for Starkist is -1.67, meaning that a 1% increase in the price of Starkist causes a 1.67% 
decrease in its quantity sold.  Allother’s partial own-price elasticity is the most elastic.   A 
brand’s elastic demand implies that if the brand raises its price and no other brands 
follow, its revenue will decline.  However, the brand is able to maintain or increase its 
revenue and market share when it increases price, even though it faces an elastic demand, 
if it has enough market power that can influence its rivals to follow. 
The elastic demand of the canned tuna industry can be explained two ways.   
First, although the products are differentiated by brand, they are substitutes.  Consumers 
can switch and buy an alternative brand if they consider an increase in price of a brand 
too high.   Second, canned tuna is a durable good.  Consumers can stockpile their favorite 
brands when prices are low.  In this case each brand is an inter-temporal substitute for 
itself (Tirole, 1988).    
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The cross-price elasticities are found off the diagonal of Table 4.8.  Six out of 
nine cross-price elasticities are statistically significant (not including those derived from 
the adding up restriction).   The significant cross-price elasticities of demand for all other 
brands are positive, meaning that they are substitutes.  The cross-price elasticity of 
demand for Chicken of the Sea with respect to Starkist’s price is 1.27, which is elastic and 
statistically significant, meaning that a 1% increase in the price of Starkist leads to a 
1.27% increase in Chicken of the Sea’ s quantity sold.   Chicken of the Sea and Allother 
seem to be good substitutes for Starkist because their cross-price elasticities with respect 
to Starkist’s price are high and elastic.   On the other hand, the cross-price significant 
elasticities of demand for Starkist with respect to the Chicken of the Sea and Allother’s 
prices are inelastic.  This suggests that consumers consider Starkist less substituTable 
than those brands in the market.  The cross-price elasticity of demand for Bumble Bee 
with respect to Starkist’s price is 0.51 and statistically significant implying that Bumble 
Bee can be a substitute for Starkist, even though it is not as good as Chicken of the Sea 
and Allother. 
 
Price-response Strategies 
To calculate the RI, OI, and CQ, price-response elasticities of firms in the canned 
tuna market are required.  The parameter estimates from price reaction functions are 
shown in Table 4.9.  Due to the double-log specification, the estimated ijφ parameter in 
equation (3.4) represents the price-response elasticities of firm i with respect to firm j’s 
price. According to the existence of a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, firms’ prices are 
supposed to have a positive relationship.  However, price-response elasticities in this  
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Table 4.9   Estimated Price Reaction Functions  
        PSK           PCS               PBB   PAO 
Intercept           2.652        0.138   2.975          -0.680 
  (0.548)***              (0.881)  (1.043)***         (0.763) 
 
PSK     -        0.667   -0.363          0.190 
         (0.174)***  (0.198) *         (0.205) 
 
PCS  0.319           -   -0.261          -0.066 
  (0.046)***     (0.078)***         (0.057) 
 
PBB  0.010   -0.002   -          0.032 
  (0.025)   (0.041)             (0.038) 
 
PAO  0.382   0.252   0.040   - 
  (0.102)***  (0.136) *  (0.160)     
 
Y/P  -0.163   0.048   -0.253          0.069 
  (0.051)***  (0.084)          (0.097)***         (0.074) 
 
SHARE  -1.531   -3.622   -6.219          0.450 
  (0.167)***  (0.348)***  (-3.60)**         (0.356) 
 
DISPLAY 0.002   -0.007   -0.001         -0.002 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)        (0.000)*** 
 
FEATURE 0.002   -0.000   -0.004          -0.002 
  (0.001)**  (0.001)   (0.001)***       (0.000)*** 
   
DISPLAY& 0.001   -0.004   -0.004          -0.004 
FEATURE (0.001)   (0.001)***  (0.001)***       (0.001)*** 
 
REDUCTION   -0.001   -0.006   -0.003          -0.002 
  (0.001)   (0.001)***  (0.001)***        (0.000)*** 
           
Parameter estimates for each equation are read by column. 
Adjusted R2 = 0.654, standard errors in parentheses,   
* = Significance at 10% level,   * * = significance at 5% level, *** = significance at 1% level 
Subscript: SK = Starkist, CS = Chicken of the Sea, BB = Bumble Bee, and AO = Allother. 
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study are found to have both positive and negative relationships.  An interpretation is that 
positive price-response elasticities imply tacit collusion among brands, and negative 
price-response elasticities imply price war.   The price-response elasticity of Starkist with 
respect to Chicken of the Sea’s price is 0.32 and statistically significant, meaning that if 
Chicken of the Sea raises price by 1%, Starkist will raise its price by 0.32%.   The price-
response elasticity of Chicken of the Sea with respect to Starkist’s price is 0.67 and 
statistically significant.  This asymmetry leads to an inference that a change in price of 
Starkist has high influence on the price of Chicken of the Sea, but a change in price of  
Chicken of the Sea has less influence on the price of Starkist.  The price-response 
elasticities of Bumble Bee with respect to prices of both Starkist and Chicken of the Sea 
are negative and statistically significant.  This implies that instead of tacitly colluding in 
price with its rivals, Bumble Bee conducts a price war.  For example, when Starkist 
increases price by 1%, Bumble Bee decreases its price by 0.36%.  According to the cross-
price elasticity of demand for Bumble Bee with respect to Starkist’s price (0.51) in Table 
4.8, Bumble Bee seems to be a substitute for Starkist, but the degree of substitution is not 
as close as for Chicken of the Sea and Allother (1.27 and 1.68, respectively).  Therefore, 
Bumble Bee’s strategy is to cut its price, in order to gain more sales in the market.  The 
price-response elasticities of Chicken of the Sea and Starkist with respect to Bumble 
Bee’s price are not statistically significant.  It implies that the two leading brands do not 
respond to Bumble Bee’s price strategy.  On the other hand, they positively respond to 
the price set by Allother because their price-response elasticities with respect to 
Allother’s price are statistically significant.  Since the results lead to the inference that 
none of the canned tuna brands in the market follow Bumble Bee’s price strategy, while 
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Bumble Bee can maintain its market share with a high price in the market, its market 
power is not derived from coordinated market power or tacit collusion.  These results can 
be confirmed by considering the measures of market power in the next section.  Twelve 
of the 16 promotion-activity variables are statistically significant.  Ten of the twelve 
promotion activities of Chicken of the Sea, Bumble Bee and Allother have negative 
effects on their respective prices and they are statistically significant.  This implies that 
when a promotional campaign is conducted, a brand tends to decrease its price.  These 
results are reasonable and easily explained.  Since one of the objectives for conducting 
promotional activities is to increase a brand’s revenue, and because those brand’s own-
price elasticities are elastic (Table 4.8), a decrease in price results in an increase in their 
revenues.   Interestingly, Starkist’s DISPLAY and FEATURE variables have positive 
impacts on its price (Table 4.9) and share (Table 4.5) and they are statistically significant.  
This leads to an inference that Starkist may have market power because it is able to 
increase both price and market share when it uses such promotional activities.  This 
inference is supported by considering the measures of market power in the next section. 
 
Measures of the Degree of Market Power 
The degree of market power of brands in the canned tuna industry is measured by 
the RI, OI, and CQ.   Estimated non-followship, fully collusive, and observed demand 
elasticities are used to calculate these measures.  Brand i’s partial own-price elasticity 
( iiη ) represents the brand’s non-followship demand elasticity.  The fully collusive 
elasticities and the observed demand elasticities of brand i are calculated using the partial 
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own- and cross-price elasticities, and price-response elasticities shown in Table 4.8 and 
4.9.   
The fully collusive elasticity of brand i , , is defined as .  The 
observed demand elasticity of brand i, , is defined as  , where 
F
iη
n
ji
ijii
F
i
≠
∑+= ηηη
ji
n
ji
ijεη∑
≠
+0iη iii ηη =0 ijη  is 
the cross-price elasticity of demand for firm i with respect to a change in price of firm j,  
and  represents rivals’ price-response elasticity or the conjectural price-response of 
firm j with respect to a change in price of firm i (i≠j).
jiε
2    
The estimated elasticities and measures of market power are shown in Table 4.10.  
The first row in Table 4.10 contains each brand’s non-followship demand elasticity (from 
Table 4.8).  The non-followship demand elasticity can be interpreted as a unilateral 
measure of market power because it measures the responsiveness in quantity purchased a 
brand experiences when it raises price but no rivals follow.  Starkist, the largest brand in 
the market, has the highest unilateral market power since its non-followship demand 
elasticity is the lowest elasticity in absolute value.   It means that when Starkist raises its 
price, consumers change their quantities demanded less than they do when the other 
brands change their prices.  The aggregated small brands, Allother, seem to have the least 
ability to maintain their unilateral market power because they have the highest elastic 
demand in absolute value.  This is reasonable since each brand in Allother possesses 
small market share and has no power in the market.   If it raised its price, its quantity 
                                                 
2 This dissertation uses all significant and insignificant parameter estimates to calculate the fully collusive 
and observed demand elasticities.  This is consistent with the way other research in this area has been done. 
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Table 4.10  Elasticities and Measures of Market Power 
   Starkist Chicken of the Sea Bumble Bee    Allother 
Non-followship 
Elasticity ( iiη )  -1.667           -2.802     -1.706       -3.887 
 
Observed 
Elasticity ( ) -1.377           -2.423     -1.682       -3.148 0iη
 
Fully Collusive 
Elasticity ( ) -0.869          -1.106     -0.532       -1.690 Fiη
 
RIi  = 
ii
F
i
η
η   0.522               0.395       0.312         0.435 
 
OIi = 0
i
F
i
η
η   0.631            0.457       0.316         0.537 
 
CQi  = 1 –
i
i
OI
RI  0.174            0.137       0.014         0.190 
 
demanded would considerably decrease.   
 The observed demand elasticities are shown in the second row of Table 4.10.   
These elasticities take into account the effect of coordinated market power, which is the 
sum of the product between cross price elasticities and price-response elasticities among 
brands in the market.  Each brand’s observed demand elasticity is less elastic than its 
non-followship demand elasticity in absolute value because of the positive effect from 
coordinated market power.    
Each brand’s fully collusive elasticity shown in the third row of Table 4.10 is 
calculated based on the assumption that the brand’s price-response elasticities equal one, 
meaning that if the brand increases its price, all rivals will raise their prices at the same 
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rate.  The fully collusive elasticities are useful in measuring the degree of market power 
of each brand.  The higher the market power a brand has, the farther is the brand’s 
observed elasticity from its non-followship elasticity, and the closer to its fully collusive 
elasticity.    
The degree of market power of a brand in this study means that the brand is able 
to set a high price without losing its market share.   (According to Table 4.1, the average 
price per unit (16 oz. equivalent) for the three leading canned tuna brands was 0.95 cents, 
whereas the average price per unit for Allother was only 0.68 cents.)  A brand’s market 
power is derived from two sources.  First, it arises from the brand characteristics such as 
image and product differentiation including promotional activities such as display and 
features.  These factors construct the brand’s unilateral market power, and the RI 
represents such power.  Second, the brand’s market power is derived from tacit collusion.  
Because firms in oligopoly are interdependent, they take into account their rivals’ 
strategies and try to respond in order to maximize their profits.  A brand’s market power 
due to tacit collusion means that the brand can influence its rivals to follow its strategy 
(e.g., a price increase).  The OI and CQ typically represent this kind of market power. 
 The RI shown in the fourth row of Table 4.10 measures a unilateral degree of 
market power of each brand.  It compares a brand’s fully collusive elasticity with non-
followship elasticity.   The value of RI ranges from zero to one.   The closer the RI is to 
one, the greater the degree of market power.  The results show that Starkist has the 
highest unilateral degree of market power with the RI equal to 0.522.   The RI of Chicken 
of the Sea, Bumble Bee and Allother is 0.395, 0.312 and 0.435, respectively.    
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Since the observed elasticity takes into account both unilateral market power and 
coordinated market power, it is crucial to investigate the results of the OI.  The fifth row 
in Table 4.10 presents the values of this index.   Not surprisingly, Starkist, the biggest 
brand in the market, has the highest degree of market power with its OI equal to 0.631.  
According to the results, the degree of market power seems to be consistent with market 
shares.   A firm with high market share has a high degree of market power.   The OI of 
Allother, Chicken of the Sea, and Bumble Bee’s OI are 0.537,  0.457, and 0.316, 
respectively.   The RI and OI of Allother are slightly higher than those of Chicken of the 
Sea and Bumble Bee.    Note that the Allother’s market share (13.90 %) is aggregated 
from many small competitive firms and the estimated coefficients from the aggregated 
market-share equation are used to calculate the own-price and cross-price elasticities.  
Therefore, it is possible that the high value of RI and OI of Allother is affected by the 
aggregated market share.   For this reason, it might not be appropriate to compare 
Allother’s degree of market power with those of the three leading brands. 
 The last row in Table 4.10 shows the values of the CQ.  The CQ measures the 
fraction of market power of the observed demand due to tacit collusion.    Basically, the 
CQ of brand i is defined as CQi 
i
i
OI
RI−=1  =
ii
i
η
η0−1 .  By simplifying the term on the 
right hand side, CQi becomes
ii
ij
jiij
η
εη∑
≠− .   It can be seen that the CQ of brand i measures 
the portion of its coordinated market power (∑ ) with respect to its non-followship 
elasticity.   The higher coordinated market power due to tacit collusion a brand has, the 
≠ ji
jiijεη
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higher the brand’s CQ.  The results from Table 4.10 show that Starkist derives 
approximately 17.4% of its market power from tacit price collusion.   Chicken of the Sea 
obtains about 13.6% of its market power from tacit collusion.3   Interestingly, although 
Bumble Bee can maintain its market power at third place (among the three leading 
brands), its market power is derived less from the coordinated market power due to tacit 
collusion because its CQ is only 1.4%.   Bumble Bee’s CQ has confirmed the results of 
price-response elasticities in Table 4.9 such that none of the canned tuna brands in the 
market follows Bumble Bee’s price strategy.    The CQ of Allother is 19.0% meaning that 
Allother derives about 19% of its market power from tacit collusion.  The coordinated 
market power exists when a firm can influence its rivals to follow its strategy.  Because 
the average price per unit of Allother is the lowest in the market, when Allother increases 
its price, the other brands are willing to cooperate by increasing their prices slightly in 
order to gain more revenue from substitution.   
 Table 4.11 presents the findings from previous studies comparing with those 
found in this study.  Cotterill (1994) estimated the degree of market power in the 
domestic carbonated soft drink industry.  Vickner and Davies (1999) analyzed market 
power in the domestic spaghetti sauce industry.  Elasticities, RI, OI, and CQ are shown in 
average values.  The carbonated soft drink industry in the Cotterill study has the lowest 
non-followship and observed elasticities on average compared to those obtained in this 
study and in the Vickner and Davies study.  Brands in the carbonated soft drink industry 
in the Cotterill study seem to have high unilateral and coordinated market power since the  
                                                 
3 When only significant parameter estimates are used to calculate the measures of market power, 
qualitatively, the results are unaltered with the exception of the CQ.  Chicken of the Sea’s CQ (0.145) is 
higher than Starkist’s CQ (0.125), meaning that Chicken of the Sea’s market power derived from tacit 
collusion is higher than that of Starkist. 
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Table 4.11   Comparing Average Elasticities and Measures of Market Power 
   Canned Tuna          Carbonated Soft Drink        Spaghetti Sauce 
Non-followship       
Elasticity ( iiη )       -2.52   -1.53      -4.97 
Observed 
Elasticity ( )      -2.16   -1.45      -4.03   0iη
Fully Collusive 
Elasticity ( )      -1.05   -0.94      -1.43 Fiη
 
RIi  = 
ii
F
i
η
η        0.42   0.67       0.28 
 
OIi = 0
i
F
i
η
η        0.49   0.72       0.34 
 
CQi  = 1 –
i
i
OI
RI       0.11a   0.15b       0.32b 
aAverage value for the three leading brands in the market 
bAverage value for the two leading brands in the market 
 
industry’s RI and OI on averages are very high (0.67 and 0.72 respectively).  The average 
RI and OI found in this study are less than those found in the Cotterill study but more 
than those found in the Vickner and Davies study.  The average fully collusive elasticity 
obtained in this study (-1.05) is close to that found in the Cotterill study (-0.94).    The 
average CQs shown in Table 4.11 are comparable to those obtained from the two leading 
brands in carbonated soft drink market (Cotterill, 1994) and in the spaghetti sauce market 
(Vickner and Davies, 1999), and from the three leading brands in this study.  The average 
CQ found in the Vickner and Davies study is the highest (0.32).  This leads to the 
inference that market power of the two leading brands in the spaghetti sauce market was 
derived more from tacit price collusion. 
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Summary of Results 
This part estimates the degrees of market power and price-response strategies of 
four canned tuna brands: Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, and Bumble Bee, and Allother.  The 
LA/AIDS and price reaction functions are estimated simultaneously using W3SLS.  The 
corrected Stone index is used in the LA/AIDS.  The results can be summarized as 
follows. 
 
• According to the test of restrictions imposed in the LA/AIDS, one of the three 
homogeneity restrictions and two of the three symmetry restrictions are 
rejected.   The estimated results are reported with restrictions imposed. 
 
• There is a significant negative relationship between market share and price in 
the canned tuna industry.  
   
• The significant partial own-price elasticities of demand for all brands are 
negative and elastic.  Starkist has the lowest own-price elasticity in absolute 
value, and Allother has the highest own-price elasticity in absolute value. 
 
• Chicken of the Sea and Allother are better substitutes for Starkist than Bumble 
Bee.   
 
• Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, and Allother are cooperative in their price 
strategies, whereas Bumble Bee conducts price war against Starkist and 
Chicken of the Sea. 
 
•  Starkist, the highest market-share brand, has the highest market power both 
unilateral and coordinated market power due to the lowest own-price elasticity 
and highest RI, OI and CQ. 
 
• Starkist and Chicken of the Sea can maintain their market power derived from 
both unilateral and coordinated market power, whereas Bumble Bee can 
maintain its market power without tacit collusion. 
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Estimating Results Using the Stone Index 
 This dissertation uses the corrected Stone index as was suggested by Moschini 
(1995) to improve the estimation of the LA/AIDS in the simultaneous equations.  In order 
to estimate the effects of differences between the two indices, the LA/AIDS was also 
estimated along with the price-reaction functions.  The results are used to calculate the 
RI, OI, and CQ.  Two changes have been made in the simultaneous equations.  First, the 
total expenditure variable is weighted by the calculated traditional Stone index.  Second, 
all price series estimated in the simultaneous equations are not normalized by their 
means.  The latter is made in order to allow the use of the elasticity formula suggested by 
Chalfant (1987), and Green and Alston (1990).   
The simultaneous equations with the Stone index in the LA/AIDS are estimated 
using the W3SLS method with correction for autocorrelation.  The estimated parameters 
from the LA/AIDS using the traditional Stone index and corrected Stone index are shown 
in Table 4.12.  The results show that parameter estimates from the two versions of indices 
have the same sign and the differences are very small.  Moreover, the standard errors of 
each pair of estimated coefficients are very close.  For example, the estimated coefficient 
of Starkist’s price  on its market share ( ) from the use of the corrected Stone Index is 
equal to -0.503, whereas the estimated coefficient obtained from the use of Stone index is 
SSγ
-0.475 and both coefficients have very close standard errors (0.072 and 0.070, 
respectively).     
Table 4.13 displays the partial own- and cross-price elasticities of demand 
calculated from estimated coefficients, which are obtained from the LA/AIDS using the  
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Table 4.12   Comparing Estimated Parameters from the LA/AIDS  
        Parameter            Estimate using            Estimate using 
                                                    Corrected Stone Index            Stone Index 
γSS    -0.503***      -0.475*** 
(0.072)       (0.070) 
γSC     0.196***       0.191***  
(0.025)        (0.024) 
γSB     0.010        0.010 
    (0.013)        (0.012) 
γSA     0.297***                                        0.273*** 
                                                         (0.064)        (0.062) 
γCC    -0.261***      -0.255*** 
(0.024)                                             (0.023) 
γCB    -0.001       -0.001 
     (0.007)        (0.007) 
γCA     0.065**       0.064** 
 (0.030)       (0.029) 
γBB    -0.035**                                                    -0.033** 
 (0.014)       ((0.014) 
γBA     0.026*        0.023 
(0.014)        (0.014) 
γAA    -0.388       -0.360 
  ( - )         ( - ) 
βS    -0.088***         -0.097*** 
 (0.030)       (0.029) 
βC     0.015         0.008 
(0.016)        (0.015) 
βB    -0.023***       -0.024*** 
 (0.006)       (0.006) 
βA     0.096         0.113      
                                                              ( - )            ( - ) 
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level, * significance at the 10% level. 
Subscript: S = Starkist, C = Chicken of the Sea, B = Bumble Bee, and A = Allother. 
(-) indicates that the parameters were derived using the adding up restrictions. 
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corrected Stone index and the traditional Stone index.  Table 4.14 shows the price-
response elasticities for the two indices.  Vuong (1989) proposed some new tests for 
model selection and non-nested hypotheses based on likelihood-ratio statistics.  However, 
the tests were more suitable for cross-section than time series data.  Since this study uses 
time series data, the tests suggested by Voung are impropriate.  However, the results from 
both versions in Table 4.13 and 4.14 are calculated in ratios for relative comparisons and 
are shown in Table 4.15 and 4.16.   All ratios comparing between the two versions for the 
partial own- and cross-price elasticities of demand shown in Table 4.15 are very close to 
1 with the difference no more than 0.2.  The ratios of the two versions for the price-
response elasticities are shown in Table 4.16.  The ratios calculated from the significant 
 
 
Table 4.13   Comparing Partial Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities 
 
                             Index Starkist Chicken of 
the Sea 
Bumble 
Bee 
Allother 
                      Corrected Stone Index  
Starkist   
                          Stone Index 
 
-1.67*** 
 
-1.62***     
0.31*** 
 
0.31*** 
0.02 
 
0.02 
0.46*** 
 
0.43*** 
                     Corrected Stone Index 
Chicken 
of the Sea          Stone Index 
 
1.27*** 
 
1.27*** 
-2.80*** 
 
-2.75*** 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
0.43** 
 
0.43** 
                     Corrected Stone Index 
Bumble  
Bee                    Stone Index 
 
0.51** 
 
0.54** 
0.06 
 
0.06 
-1.71*** 
 
-1.66*** 
0.61** 
 
0.55** 
                     Corrected Stone Index 
Allother 
                          Stone Index 
 
1.68 
 
1.42 
0.37 
 
0.34 
0.15 
 
0.13 
-3.89 
 
-3.70 
Elasticities are read from left to right;  
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level 
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Table 4.14   Comparing Price-response elasticities1 
 
                             Index Starkist Chicken of 
the Sea 
Bumble 
Bee 
Allother 
                      Corrected Stone Index  
Starkist   
                          Stone Index 
 
- 
 
-          
0.32*** 
 
0.32*** 
0.01 
 
0.02 
0.38*** 
 
0.35*** 
                     Corrected Stone Index 
Chicken 
of the Sea          Stone Index 
 
0.67*** 
 
0.66*** 
- 
 
- 
-0.002 
 
-0.004 
0.25* 
 
0.25* 
                     Corrected Stone Index 
Bumble  
Bee                    Stone Index 
 
-0.36* 
 
-0.35* 
-0.26*** 
 
-0.27*** 
- 
 
- 
0.04 
 
0.01 
                     Corrected Stone Index 
Allother 
                          Stone Index 
 
0.19 
 
0.18 
-0.07 
 
-0.07 
0.03 
 
0.03 
- 
 
- 
1Elasticities are read from left to right;  
*** Significance at the 1% level, * significance at the 10% level 
 
 
 
Table 4.15   Ratios Comparing Partial Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities  
 Starkist Chicken of the 
Sea 
Bumble Bee Allother 
Starkist 0.95* 1.00* 1.00 1.07* 
Chicken of the Sea 1.00* 1.02* 1.00 1.00* 
Bumble Bee 0.94* 1.00 1.06* 1.20* 
Allother 1.18* 1.08 1.15 1.05 
Each ratio = result from the use of the corrected Stone index / result from the use of the 
traditional Stone index.         
* Calculated from significant parameter estimates 
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Table 4.16   Ratios Comparing Price-Response Elasticities  
                  
 Starkist Chicken of the 
Sea 
Bumble Bee Allother 
Starkist - 1.00* 0.50 1.08* 
Chicken of the Sea 1.01* - 0.50 1.00* 
Bumble Bee 1.03* 0.96* - 4.00 
Allother 1.05 1.00 1.00 - 
Each ratio = result from the use of the corrected Stone index / result from the use of the 
traditional Stone index.        
* Calculated from significant parameter estimates 
 
coefficients are close to one, indicating a small difference between the two versions.   
The RI, OI, and CQ calculated from both versions are shown in Table 4.17.  The 
ratios of the measures are shown in Table 4.18.  The scanner data used in this study seem 
to be consistent with both price indices because their results are similar.   For example, 
the RI of Starkist estimated from the use of the corrected Stone index is 0.522, whereas 
those estimated from the use of the Stone index is 0.530 with the ratio of 0.98.    
Starkist’s OI estimated from the use of the corrected Stone index is 0.631, whereas those 
estimated from the use of the corrected Stone index is 0.638 and the ratio is 0.99.     
The empirical results in this dissertation lead to a conclusion that there only is a slight 
difference from the use of the corrected Stone index and the traditional Stone index in the 
LA/AIDS.  However, these results are estimated from time- series scanner data in a single 
local market covering a short time period.  Moreover, the only product analyzed is 
canned tuna.  Therefore, it cannot be generalized that there is no difference between the 
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use of the two versions of the Stone index applied to other products or to other data.  
Further studies will be needed to clarify this issue. 
 
 
Table 4.17   Comparing Measures of Market Power 
 
 RI 
Corrected         Stone 
Stone Index     Index 
OI 
Corrected           Stone 
Stone Index        Index 
CQ 
Corrected         Stone 
Stone Index     Index 
Starkist 
 
    0.522           0.530    0.631             0.638           0.174          0.169 
Chicken of 
the Sea 
    0.395           0.385    0.457             0.447     0.137          0.139 
Bumble Bee 
 
    0.312           0.305    0.316             0.309     0.014          0.012 
Allother 
 
    0.435           0.489    0.537             0.582           0.190          0.159 
Average     0.416           0.426    0.485             0.494     0.128          0.120 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.18   Ratios Comparing Measures of Market Power 
 
 RI OI CQ 
Starkist 
 
0.98 0.99 1.03 
Chicken of the Sea 
 
1.02 1.02 0.98 
Bumble Bee 
 
1.02 1.02 1.16 
Allother 
 
0.89 0.92 1.18 
Average 
 
0.98 0.98 1.06 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusions 
 
The first part of this dissertation estimated the degree of market power of brands 
in the $2.1 billion canned tuna industry.  The study investigated brands’ behaviors at the 
local level and Knoxville, Tennessee was chosen as a representative local market.  
Scanner data of prices, quantity sold, and promotional activities were collected weekly by 
the IRI for 157 weeks over the period of January 4, 1998 to December 31, 2000 from 134 
supermarkets in Knoxville.  The canned tuna market was highly concentrated because the 
highest three-firm market shares over the study period were more than 80 percent of the 
total sales.  There are four canned-tuna brands in this study; Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, 
and Bumble Bee, and Allother.  
A brand’s market power is derived from two sources.  First, it comes from the 
brand’s product differentiation such as advertising, packages, and image.  These factors 
construct the brand’s unilateral market power.  Second, the brand’s market power is 
derived from tacit collusion (coordinated market power) meaning that the brand can 
influence its rivals to follow its price strategy.  Three measures of market power are 
employed in this study, the Rothschild and O Indices, and the Chamberlin Quotient.   
In order to calculate a brand’s RI, OI, and CQ, the brand’s partial own- and cross-
price elasticities, and price-response elasticities are needed.  Therefore, simultaneous 
equations including both demand and supply equations are constructed.  On the demand 
side, the LA/AIDS is employed, whereas price-reaction functions are applied on the 
 87 
supply side.  The assumption of Bertrand competition with differentiated products is set 
such that price is the strategic variable and that brands make their decisions at the same 
time period.   
 Previous empirical studies (Cotterill, 1994 and Vickner and Davies, 1999) 
estimated the degree of market power in carbonated soft drink and spaghetti sauce 
markets using the Stone index in the LA/AIDS.  However, some studies found that the 
use of the Stone index in the LA/AIDS causes estimated parameters to be biased and 
inconsistent (Pashardes, 1993 and Moschini, 1995).  This dissertation uses the corrected 
Stone index suggested by Moschini (1995) in the LA/AIDS estimation in order to 
disentangle the problems.   
 The simultaneous equations with three demand equations and four price reaction 
functions are estimated using W3SLS with a correction of autocorrelation.  The 
parameter estimates obtained from the LA/AIDS are used to calculate partial own- and 
cross-price elasticities of demand for each brand, whereas price-response elasticities are 
obtained directly from the parameter estimates from the price reaction functions.  All 
brands’ partial own-price elasticities are consistent with the law of demand, and found 
elastic.  The own-price elasticity of demand for Starkist is the least elastic.  All canned 
tuna brands in the market are substitutes since their cross-price elasticities are positive.  
The estimated price-response elasticities represent strategic-price responses among 
brands in the market.  The results show that Starkist and Chicken of the Sea are 
cooperative, whereas Bumble Bee conducts price war.  When Starkist or Chicken of the 
Sea raises their prices, Bumble Bee responds by cutting its price. 
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 The degree of market power of a canned tuna brand is measured by the RI, OI, 
and CQ.  A brand with high degree of market power can not only set a high price and 
maintain its level of market share, but also influence its rivals to follow its price strategy.  
The RI measures the degree of unilateral market power of a brand.  The OI measures both 
the degree of unilateral and coordinated market power.  The CQ measures percentage of 
market power derived from tacit collusion.  The results show that Starkist, the biggest 
brand in the market, can maintain its market power at the highest level with the highest 
RI, OI and CQ.  Both Starkist’ and Chicken of the Sea’s market power is derived from 
both unilateral and coordinated market power.  Bumble Bee, the third leading firm in the 
market, however, can maintain its unilateral market power without tacit collusion.  
 Finally, this study re-estimates the simultaneous equations with the use of the 
traditional Stone index in the LA/AIDS.  The parameter estimates from the estimation 
using the Stone index are compared to those of the first version.  The results from both 
versions are found very close giving the interpretation of market power in the same 
fashion.   
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
In the first part of this study, strategic-price responses among firms were 
investigated using the price-response elasticities obtained from the estimated price-
reaction functions.  It was assumed that the canned tuna market was characterized by 
Bertrand competition with differentiated products such that price was the strategic choice 
variable, and firms made their decisions during the same time period.  The findings 
indicated that Bumble Bee conducted a price war against Starkist and Chicken of the Sea.  
However, both Starkist and Chicken of the Sea did not respond to the Bumble Bee price 
strategy during the same time period.   The price-response results obtained from the first 
part provide evidence only on static price behavior and do not describe any dynamic price 
behavior.  Vickner and Davies (2000) commented that current studies are not sufficient to 
supply firms in the food industry “with practical, empirical procedures for estimating 
strategic price response.”    
A dynamic or supergame theory is able to explain strategic price response (Tirole, 
1988).  The supergame theory characterizes multiple outcomes.  Cartwright et al. (1989) 
examined the advantages and disadvantages of the static and dynamic price-correlation 
tests and concluded that an application of a dynamic model such as a Granger-causality 
test is a useful supplement to test price correlations.  Multivariate-time series modeling 
techniques, mainly as applied in macroeconomic analyses, support statistical concepts 
that improve the study of dynamic price-response criteria.  
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This part extends the static model of part one to a dynamic approach.  The 
Bertrand-competition assumption is dropped in this part, and a firm is assumed to set its 
price depending on its own past prices and those of rivals.  A vector autoregressive 
(VAR) model is employed and its applications are used to investigate the price 
relationships.  The Granger-causality test, the impulse response function (IRF) analysis, 
and the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) analysis are applied to the VAR.  
The Granger-causality test examines not only whether dynamic price-response 
relationships exist, but also for types of strategic-price relationships such as price 
leadership or price war.  The IRF analysis graphically reveals the direction of the effect 
of a one-time shock to one of the innovations on future values of the endogenous 
variables, whereas the FEVD analysis measures proportions of a brand’s price variation 
that can be explained by shocks to its own price and it rivals’ prices for each forecast 
horizon.   
The results obtained from this part disentangle a problem encountered from the 
first part.  Although Starkist and Chicken of the Sea do not respond Bumble Bee’s price 
strategy during the same time period, the Granger-causality results show that both 
Starkist and Chicken of the Sea respond negatively to Bumble Bee’s past price.  This 
means that both Starkist and Chicken of the Sea also conduct price war but in a dynamic 
way.  The results from the IRF and FEVD analyses also support the Granger-causality 
test results for the three-leading canned-tuna brands’ relationships.   
With respect to previous research in strategic-price relationships, Vickner and 
Davies (2000) estimated strategic-price response between two leading brands in the 
canned pineapple industry using the VAR and vector error correction model.  The 
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Granger causality test and the IRF analysis were applied to investigate the price 
relationships.  However, confidence intervals were not included in the Vickner and 
Davies IRF results.  Confidence intervals are useful in determining the statistically 
significant regions of the IRFs.  Failing to include confidence intervals may affect the 
interpretation of their estimated results.  This dissertation improves on the analysis by 
including the confidence intervals in the IRF analysis.   Moreover, this dissertation 
includes the FEVD analysis, which was not used in Vickner and Davies’ work, to 
investigate firms’ price variations affected by their rivals’ price innovations. 
The remainder of this part is structured as follows.  Chapter Two presents the 
econometric modeling approach and literature review. Chapter Three introduces the 
econometric methodology used for the estimation.  Chapter Four reports the findings, and 
Chapter Five presents a conclusion.  Further information on the data can be found in part 
one.   
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Chapter Two 
Econometric Modeling Approach and Literature Review 
 
 This chapter presents a framework for analysis of the strategic price responses 
among brands in the canned tuna industry based on a dynamic system of equations.  A 
vector autoregressive (VAR) model is developed to investigate dynamic-strategic price 
responses.  The chapter begins with the empirical model and then provides a review of 
the relevant literature.  The empirical tools are presented first to facilitate an 
understanding of the applied literature. 
 
Econometric Modeling Approach 
Bertrand competition assumes each firm simultaneously sets its profit-maximizing 
price given the current prices other firms charge.  The price-reaction functions in 
equation (3.4) presented in the first part used only static information on price behaviors 
among firms.  They did not allow for the possibility of dynamic price behavior.   In 
practice, it is not necessary that firms’ decisions be based on prices during the same time 
period.  A firm’s price strategy can possibly depend on its past prices or its rivals’ past 
prices.  To investigate the potential for a dynamic strategic-price response, the Bertrand-
competition assumption used in the first part is dropped.  A firm is assumed to set its 
price depending on its own past prices and those of rivals.  A dynamic, or supergame, 
theory is able to explain strategic price response (Tirole, 1988).  The supergame theory 
characterizes multiple outcomes.  Multivariate-time series modeling techniques provide 
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statistical concepts for the study of competitive price responses as a dynamic adjustment 
process.   
The modeling approach starts with the formulation of a general vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model (Sims, 1980).  The VAR model is specified as: 
titi
k
i
t uPAP +∑= −=1 ,       (2.1) 
where is a column vector of n variables at time t, ,  is an (n x 
n) matrix of parameters with no zero elements, i represents a time lag, for i = 1, 2,.., k, 
and is a column vector of random errors which are assumed to be contemporaneously 
correlated but not auto-correlated.  Equation (2.1) is different from the structural-
equations approach, such as the price-reaction functions used in the first part, because no 
zero restrictions are imposed on the model, meaning that there is no price variable 
excluded from any equation of the model, and only endogenous variables are included 
(Charemza and Deadman, 1997).  Therefore, the model in equation (2.1) is called an 
unrestricted VAR model.   A firm in the canned tuna market is assumed to set its price 
depending on its own past prices and those of rivals so the unrestricted VAR model in 
equation (2.1) can be used to investigate firms’ pricing behaviors.  
tP
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Gujarati (1995) summarized advantages and disadvantages of using VAR models.  
The advantages of VAR are as follows. 
(1) The method is simple to use.  Because all variables in VAR are endogenous, 
one does not have to worry about determining which variables are endogenous 
and which variables are exogenous. 
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(2) Estimation is simple.  The OLS methods can be used to each equation 
separately. 
(3) In many cases, the forecasts obtained from VAR are better than those obtained 
from the more complex simultaneous equation models. 
Problems with VAR models are noted below. 
(1) A VAR model is said to be a-theoretic, because it is not based on formal theory, 
unlike the model of part one.  
(2) VAR models are less suited for policy analysis, since policy parameters do not 
explicitly appear. 
(3) If the order of appropriate lag length is high, there will be many parameter 
estimates.  This may limit the degrees of freedom for hypothesis testing. 
(4) All variables in the VAR model must be stationary.  If the model contains a mix 
of stationary and non-stationary variables, transforming the data will not be easy. 
 
When dealing with dynamic time series data, the majority of recent empirical 
studies found that the data are non-stationary because the means, variances, and 
covariances of the variables are not constant over time (Charemza and Deadman, 1992).  
Often, differencing a time series can lead to stationarity.  For example, suppose that a 
time series variable for brand 1,  , is non-stationary and is generated by 1tp
 ,        (2.2) 11 1
1
ttt epp += −
 where e represents an error term series of identically distributed stationary variables and 1t
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is iid ~ (0, ).  By differencing  by  from both sides of the equation, the series 
becomes stationary.  That is 
I2σ 1tp 1 1−tp
11
1
1
ttt epp =− − ,        (2.3) 
In this case,  is said to be integrated of order 1, I(1).  A non-stationary series is said to 
be integrated of order d, I(d), if it can be transformed to a stationary series by 
differencing d times (Charemza and Deadman, 1992).   
1
tp
Dickey and Fuller (1979) have proposed a simple test for the order of integration 
of in equation (2.2), called the DF test.  The objective of the DF test is to test  in 
the autoregressive equation: 
tp 1=ρ
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The DF test, also known as the unit root test, is a test of the null hypothesis that in 
equation (2.4)  from the equivalent regression equation to (2.4), that is: 01 =−ρ
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If the null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternative can be accepted, the series  
is stationary and  ~ I(0).  But if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, it implies that 
the series might be integrated of order 1 or higher or might not be integrated at all.  
Therefore, the next step would be to test whether the order of integration is one.  If  ~ 
I(1), then ~ I(0).  Hence we can repeat the test replacing with .  In practice, 
we can continue the process until we found an order of integration for  (Charemza and 
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Deadman, 1992).   The DF test can also be used with drift and/or a linear deterministic 
trend.  The DF equation with drift and a linear deterministic trend is specified as: 
11
1
1
tt
d
t eptp +++=∆ −δθµ ,      (2.6) 
where is a constant or intercept representing drift and tµ d is a linear deterministic trend. 
 The DF test can be used only if there is no autocorrelation.  In the case that the 
error term e is autocorrelated, the DF test can be modified to include enough lagged 
difference terms so that the error terms are serially independent.  The modified DF test is 
called augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.  The ADF equation with drift can be 
specified as 
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1
itp −∆  = ,  1 11 −−− − itit pp
i represents a time lag, for i = 1, 2,.., j, and 
vt represents an error term series of identically distributed stationary variables and is iid ~ 
(0, ).   I2σ
The null hypothesis is still that  = 0 or , that is, there exists a unit root in  
series.  Note that the ADF test can also be used with an inclusion of a linear deterministic 
trend.  The ADF test is extensively used in empirical research (e.g., Charemza and 
Deadman, 1992; Benson et al.., 1995; Masih and Masih, 2000; Vickner and Davies, 
2000).  However, it is necessary to use the ADF test with care.  Charemza and Deadman 
(1992) commented that the choice of augmentation terms (the lagged difference terms) in 
δ 1=ρ tp
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the ADF equation was important, but it was neglected in the literature.  Too many 
augmentations may cause a decrease in the power of the test, resulting in not rejecting the 
null hypothesis too often.  On the other hand, too few augmentations may affect the size 
of the test, resulting in rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root too often.   
 An alternative test for a unit root is developed by Phillips and Perron (1988), 
called The Phillips-Perron test or the PP test.  The PP test generalizes the DF test to 
situations that allow for fairly mild assumptions concerning the distribution of the errors.  
That is, it is possible to test a unit root even though the error terms are not iid ~ (0, ).   
The PP test starts with the following regression equations: 
I2σ
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where the error term has zero mean. 1tε
There is no requirement that the error term is serially uncorrelated or homogeneous.  
Unlike the DF assumptions of non-autocorrelation and homogeneity, the PP test allows 
the disturbances to be weakly dependent and heterogeneously distributed (Enders, 1995).  
Phillips and Perron (1988) characterized the distribution and derived test statistics that 
can be used to test the coefficients  under the null hypothesis that a unit root in the 
series exists.   Critical values for the PP statistics are the same as those given for the ADF 
tests.    
ρ
Choi (1992) conducted Monte Carlo experiments to study how the ADF and PP 
tests for a unit root perform.  They used data generated by aggregating-subinterval data 
rather than the subinterval data themselves.  The study concluded that for the aggregated 
subinterval data the PP test was more powerful than the ADF test in finite sample.  
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Specifically, for the aggregate data the PP test has greater power to reject a false null 
hypothesis of a unit root.  However, Choi and Chung (1995) found in their Monte Carlo 
experiments that for data with high sampling frequency, the PP test appears to be less 
powerful than the Dickey-Fuller test in finite samples.  Enders (1995) notes that, when 
the true model has negative moving average terms, the ADF test is preferable; however, 
when the true model has positive moving average terms, the PP test is more appropriate.   
In practice, it is difficult to choose the most appropriate test because the true data-
generating process is never known.  Therefore, both types of unit-root tests should be 
used.   If they support each other, one can have confidence in the results.  If they do not 
support each other, one of the two results has to be chosen.  Additional analysis of the 
type of data, the sample time period, or economic theory might be useful in considering 
the most appropriate test (Enders, 1995).   
If the variables in the vector P  in equation (2.1) are found to be non-stationary, 
the estimation of the VAR will give spurious results (Gujarati, 1995).  There are two 
ways to solve the problem.  One way is to regress the unrestricted VAR on first 
differences of all variables (if all variables are found to be I(1)).  This process can 
eliminate the non-stationarity from the variables; however it is not the best solution 
(Patterson, 2000) and may involve a misspecification (Enders, 1995).    The reason is that 
valuable information about long-run relationships among variables would be lost from 
taking the first differences.      
t
Another way arises when the non-stationary variables are co-integrated.  It is 
possible that some linear combination of a set of non-stationary time series is stationary, 
i.e., the set of series is co-integrated.   If two or more variables have long-run equilibrium 
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relationship(s) or share common trend(s) or give a stationary linear combination, they are 
said to be co-integrated (Masih and Masih, 2000).   The presence of a co-integrating 
relation forms the basis of a restricted VAR or a vector error correction (VEC) model.   
The VAR model of k-th order in equation (2.1) can be re-parameterized in a VEC form 
as: 
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where 
iΓ = – (Ai+1 + Ai+2 +…+ Ak), i = 1, …, k-1, 
Π = –(I – A1 – A2 – …– Ak), 
I is an identity matrix of order n,  
and denotes first differences. ∆
A VEC model is a restricted VAR model designed for use with non-stationary 
time series that are found to be co-integrated.  The VEC model has co-integrating 
relations constructed into the specification so that it restricts the long-run behavior of the 
endogenous variables to converge to their co-integrating relationships, while allowing for 
dynamic adjustment.  According to the VEC model in equation (2.8), the co-integration 
effects are represented by .  The  matrix (n× n) can be written as two (n× r) 
matrices α and β, (1≤ r ≤ n – 1 = the number of co-integrated vectors), such that Π = 
.  The matrix β contains r co-integrating vectors representing long-run relationships 
among P
1−Π tP Π
βα ′
t-1.  The matrix α consists of the parameters measuring the speed of adjustment 
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of each stationary co-integrating combination.  The short-run dynamic responses are 
explained by the elements in .   iΓ
 
Applications of the VAR Analysis 
Sims (1980) and Enders (1995) recommended that the goal of VAR analysis be to 
investigate the interrelationships among the variables, not the parameter estimates.  There 
are (n + kn2) terms to be estimated in a VAR model, where n is the number of variables 
and k is the number of lags.  Because the models are over-parameterized, it is difficult 
and not useful to interpret the relationships between variables from the coefficients in the 
estimated VAR models.  For this reason, researchers in this area have used the VAR 
applications to study interrelationships among variables instead.  Several applications of 
the VAR analysis are used in this study.  First, the VAR model allows the use of the 
Granger causality test to clarify the relevant information.  One may want to know 
whether an increase of a brand’s price results in an increase in other brands’ prices when 
they would not have changed otherwise, or whether the relationship works in the opposite 
direction.  Charemza and Deadman (1992) addressed the definition of Granger causality 
in a simplified way that “x is a Granger cause of y, if present values of y can be predicted 
with better accuracy by using past values of x rather than by not doing so, other 
information being identical.”  Assume that a firm in the canned tuna market sets its price 
depending on its own past prices and those of rivals.  Granger causality can be applied to 
test such dynamic price reactions.  Specifically, the Granger-causality test gives 
information about strategic-price responses between a pair of firms.  If firm i’s pricing 
strategy depends on firm j’s past price, but it is not true in the opposite direction, 
 102 
theoretically, firm j will be defined as a price leader, and firm i will be defined as a price 
follower.   If both firms’ price strategies depend on each other’s past prices, it can be 
interpreted that they conduct warfare (Vickner and Davies, 2000).    
The VAR model can be used to forecast the signs of the short-run responses of 
variables by means of an impulse response function (IRF) when there is an exogenous 
shock on one of the variables.  Gujarati (1995) noted that the individual coefficients in 
the estimated VAR models were often difficult to interpret so the researchers often used 
IRF analysis instead.  In the literature, a unitary change in a variable or an error term is 
called a variable shock or innovation.  An IRF allows a graphical representation of the 
effect of a one-time shock to one of the innovations on future values of the endogenous 
variables. If the innovations between equations are contemporaneously uncorrelated, 
interpretation of the impulse response function is simple.  A change in innovation of a 
firm by one unit at time t is simply a shock to its own future price.  With respect to 
equation (2.1), a change in innovation of a firm by one unit at time t is equivalent to a 
change in the firm’s price by one unit at time t (because all lag variables on the right hand 
side of the VAR are predetermined), and because the error terms are contemporaneously 
correlated, it not only can affect the firm’s price in the future, but can also be transmitted 
to the other firms’ prices over time.  IRFs can be derived by mathematically transforming 
a VAR model into a vector-moving average (VMA) model.  IRFs are matrices of 
coefficients in a VMA model, in which its error terms are orthogonal, i.e., they are not 
contemporaneously correlated (Charemza and Deadman, 1992, p. 161-164).  In empirical 
work, the process that transforms error terms to be orthogonal in order to identify impulse 
responses is called a Choleski decomposition.   
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It is helpful to understand the properties of the forecast errors to reveal 
interrelationships among variables in the system.  Enders (1995) suggested that it is 
convenient to describe the properties of the forecast errors from the VAR in terms of the 
error sequence.  It is possible to decompose the t-step (period) ahead forecast error 
variance due to each one of the shocks.  The forecast error variance decomposition 
(FEVD) measures the proportion of the variation in a variable that is explained by its own 
innovation as well as by the innovations in the other variables.  Each step or time period 
is called forecast horizon.  If all variables of interest are endogenous, the forecast errors 
variance of each error sequence will be explained by shocks at all forecast horizons 
(Enders, 1995).   In empirical research, it is normal for a variable to explain almost all of 
its forecast error variance at short horizons, and smaller proportions at longer horizons.  
Like IRF analysis, the Choleski decomposition is a necessary tool to identify FEVD.  
Both IRFs and FEVDs are computed by most econometric packages which incorporate 
VAR and VEC analysis.  Therefore, the study of strategic-price response can be 
characterized by the use of IRFs and FEVDs.  
 In sum, the VAR and VEC models can be applied to investigate the dynamic 
interrelationships among price series in two ways.  The first way is to use the Granger 
causality test for firms’ price-response relationships such as leader-follower relationship 
or warfare.  The second way is to see when there is a unitary exogenous shock on a 
brand’s price, how the other brands respond over time after the shock occurred.  The IRF 
analysis tells us about the direction in which a price series responds to shocks.  The 
FEVD analysis examines the proportions of the movements in a series due to its own 
shocks and shocks from the other variables. 
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Literature Review 
 An econometric technique based on dynamic time-series methodology has been 
emphasized in macroeconomic and monetary research since the early 1980s (Sims, 1980; 
Litterman and Weiss, 1985; Friedman and Kuttner, 1993; and Thoma, 1994).   Later, 
dynamic time-series techniques, such as VAR and VEC models, were widely used in 
applied microeconomic fields, e.g., energy economics, agricultural economics analysis  
and industrial organization.  A list of some of the studies that have used the time series 
analysis in applied microeconomic fields is shown in Table 2.1.   
Dynamic time series models, such as VAR and VEC, have been used to analyze 
markets and pricing conduct.  The VAR model proved to have high performance in 
forecasting a price movement in agricultural-marketing products (Park, 1990, and 
Gjolberg and Bengtsson, 1997).    
The VAR applications such as the Granger-causality test, the IRF analysis, and 
the FEVD analysis are used in this part.  The Granger-causality test is employed to 
investigate the price-response relationships among canned tuna brands in the market.  
Several studies used the Granger-causality test to estimate relationships among variables 
of interest.  Cartwright et al. (1989) suggested that a dynamic time-series application, 
such as the Granger-causality test, was a useful supplement to the price-correlation 
analysis.  Giot et al. (1999) investigated market leadership in European markets for 
imported off-season fresh apples and grapes.  With the use of the Granger-causality test, 
they found that the major import market of Rotterdam significantly led the wholesale 
markets in France and Germany for apples.  Tiffin and Dawson (2000) examined the  
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Table 2.1   Listing of Research in Applied Microeconomics using Time Series Methods 
 
Auther 
(Published year) 
 
Objective 
Cartwright et al. (1989) Examining price correlation to determine the relevant 
product and geographic market 
Park (1990) Comparing the VAR performance to alternatives 
Vogelvang (1992) Investigating long-run relationships of coffee prices 
Vany and Walls (1993) Investigating long-run relationships of natural gas spot 
prices in the U.S. 
Benson et al. (1995) Examining long-run relationships for market delineation  
Gjolberg and Bengtsson 
(1997) 
Comparing the VAR performance to alternatives 
Urga (1999) Estimating inter-fuel substitution in U.S. 
Ramanathan (1999) Estimating short- and long-run price and income 
elasticities of gasoline demand in India 
Giot et al. (1999) Testing market leadership in the European fresh fruit 
market 
Vany and Walls (1999) Investigating long-run relationships of electricity spot 
prices in the U.S. 
Tiffin and Dawson (2000) Investigating producer-retail price relationship in the UK 
lamb market 
Vickner and Davies 
(2000) 
Estimating strategic price-response in the canned 
pineapple industry in the U.S. 
Pagan et al. (2001) Investigating the impact of advertising expenditures on 
citrus sales from the Texas Rio Grande Valley 
Kaufmann and Cleveland 
(2001) 
Investigating oil production in the U.S. 
 
relationships between the retail price and the producer price of lamb in England.  They 
found that lamb prices in the retail market significantly affected the producer prices but 
not in the opposite direction.  Pagan et al. (2001) analyzed the impact of advertising 
expenditures on citrus sales from the Texas Rio Grande Valley. They found that 
advertising expenditures Granger-caused increases in citrus sales, but it was not true in 
the opposite direction. 
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The other useful applications of the VAR model are the IRF and FEVD analyses.  
Benson et al. (1995) suggested that the multivariate time series techniques offer new 
insights regarding antitrust market delineation.   IRF and FEVD analyses were employed 
in their research to analyze the speed and strength with which a price series responds to 
shocks occurring in other series.    Pagan et al. (2001) used the IRF and FEVD analyses 
as additional tools to support the results obtained from the Granger-causality test.   They 
found that the IRF and FEVD findings were consistent with those obtained from the 
Granger-causality test. 
The previous research which is closely related to this part is that of Vickner and 
Davies (2000).  They estimated strategic price response in a product-differentiated 
oligopoly, the canned pineapple industry, using national-level weekly scanner data from 
June 1994 to October 1996.   Two canned pineapple firms in the U.S., Del Monte and 
Dole, were investigated.  The study started with the ADF test to examine stationarity of 
each firm’s price series and found that the price series of both Dole and Del Monte were 
stationary with the deterministic time trend included without controlling for seasonality, 
but only one of the two was stationary with the deterministic time trend included after 
controlling for seasonality.  However, without controlling for the time trend, a unit root 
was found in the price series of both firms, and the study concluded that each price series, 
without a time trend, was an integrated process of order 1 or I(1).   The stationary price 
series with the deterministic trend included was estimated using the VAR model.  The 
non-stationary price series without controlling the time trend was tested for co-integration 
and estimated using the VEC model.  They found that a linear combination between price 
series of Dole and Del Monte existed that was stationary.  The results from the 
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unrestricted VAR and VEC models were compared and found to be supported by each 
other.  The hypothesis of price leadership was tested using Granger causality.  In 
addition, the pricing relationships were analyzed by the IRF analysis.  The results from 
the Granger causality test showed that Dole was the leader in determining price in the 
market, whereas Del Monte followed Dole’s pricing decisions.  The results, in fact, 
confirmed the price leadership hypothesis.  The IRF analysis also supported the price 
leadership hypothesis.  Finally, the study suggested that an empirical time series analysis 
may be used to support industrial organization theorists when studying dynamic games.   
This part is different from the Vickner and Davies study in two ways.  First, it 
improves the price-response study by including confidence intervals in the IRF results, 
which were not included in Vickner and Davies’ IRF analysis.   Second, it includes the 
FEVD analysis, which was not used in the Vickner and Davies study, to rigorously 
investigate pricing relationships.   The FEVD results can give additional information to 
the IRF and Granger-causality results in estimating price-response effects.   
 In sum, the strategic-price responses among canned tuna brands can be 
investigated using the VAR applications, including the Granger-causality test, the IRF 
analysis, and the FEVD analysis.  The Granger-causality test examines whether the 
dynamic price-response relationships exist.  The IRF analysis graphically reveals the 
direction of the effect of a one-time shock to one of the innovations on future values of 
the endogenous variables, whereas the FEVD analysis measures proportions of a brand’s 
price variations that can be explained by shocks to its own price and it rivals’ prices for 
each forecast horizon.   
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Chapter Three 
Econometric Methodology  
 
 
An objective in this part is to estimate strategic price responses among canned 
tuna brands based on a dynamic approach. The Bertrand-competition assumption is 
dropped and replaced by the assumption that a firm in the market sets its price depending 
on its own past prices and those of rivals.  This chapter starts with testing for unit roots 
and the order of integration for each price series using the ADF and PP test.  Several lag 
length criteria are presented within the estimation of the VAR model.  Presented next are 
applications of the VAR model including pairwise Granger-causaltity tests and the 
analysis of IRFs and FEVDs to investigate the dynamic price-response relationships.  
Finally, the four price series are used.  Further information on the data can be found in 
part one.   
 
Testing for Unit Root and Order of Integration 
 The four price series (Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, Bumble Bee, and Allother) 
used in the first part are tested for unit roots and the order of integration.  Empirical 
research that uses a structural model based on a static approach typically ignores non-
stationarity and assumes that the time series are stationary (Gujarati, 1995).   However, 
the use of non-stationary variables in a dynamic time series regression gives spurious 
results (Gujarati, 1995); therefore, testing for stationarity is a necessary process in 
estimating dynamic time series models.  The most efficient test, which is extensively 
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used in empirical research, is the ADF test.  The ADF test can be used by including drift 
and/or a linear deterministic trend.  The ADF test for a price series used in this study 
is specified as: 
tp
∑
=
−− +∆++=∆
j
i
tititt ppp
1
1 νφδµ      ,                               (3.1)        
where  
tp  represents the observed price series, 
tp∆ = ,  1−− tt pp
itp −∆  = ,  1−−− − itit pp
i represents a time lag, for i = 1, 2,.., j,  
µ is a constant or intercept representing drift , and 
vt represents an error term series of identically distributed stationary variables and is iid ~ 
(0, ).   I2σ
 The ADF t-statistics is based on 
 ,      (3.2) δσδ ˆˆ/)1ˆ( −=tADF
where is the usual least squares estimated error of .   δσ ˆˆ δˆ
The null hypothesis is that  = 0, that is, there exists a unit root in  meaning that the 
series is non-stationary.  The ADF test includes enough lagged difference terms so that 
the error term is serially independent, and that can be checked during the process.   
δ tp
 The PP test is also a powerful test for a unit root and, therefore, is employed.  The 
PP test is based on an initial least squares fit of the regression  
 110 
 .       (3.3) ttt pp ερα ++= −1
Equation (3.3) is non-parametric because there is no assumption that the error term  is 
white noise.   Let be generated by , where 
tε
tp ttt Lp εψε )(==∆ )(Lψ is a power series in 
the lag operator L and , the residual from equation (3.3), is zero-mean white noise with 
variance .   
tε
2
εσ
The PP t-statistic is specified as 
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where  and  are consistent estimators of the short- and long-run variances defined as 0γˆ 2ˆλ
)( 20 tE εγ = ; , and 222 )}1({ψσλ ε= )1/(21 −Σ= =− Tpp t
T
t
(Leybourne and Newbold, 1999). 
The coefficient  is tested under the null hypothesis that there exists a unit root in the 
series.    
ρ
Both the ADF and PP test are done using the EView software package.  If all 
price series are stationary, the dynamic-price reactions will be estimated using the VAR 
model.  If all price series are non-stationary, the dynamic-price reactions will be 
estimated using the VECM and co-integration analysis. 
 
Selecting for Lag Length 
 A proper lag length must be selected before the VAR model is utilized so that the 
error terms of each equation in the model are not serially correlated.  The VAR model 
used in this study is specified as: 
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k
i
t uPAP +∑+= −=1θ ,       (3.5) 
where 
Pt is a column vector of price series of Starkist, Bumble Bee, Chicken of the Sea and 
Allother, 
θ and are unknown parameters to be estimated,  A
i represents a time lagged, for i = 1, 2,.., k, and 
tu is a column vector of random errors which are assumed to be contemporaneously 
correlated but not auto-correlated at an appropriate lag length k.   
The selection process uses a general-to-specific method.  The maximum lag is 
assumed and tested, and then the number of lags is decreased and tested until the 
appropriate lag length is found.  There are several criteria used to select the lag length.  
These criteria are described as follows: 
i) The Likelihood ratio test (LR) 
Starting from the maximum lag, the LR tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients on 
lag k are jointly zero using the statistic, and the number of lags is decreased one at a 
time until the null hypothesis is rejected.   The distribution has degrees of freedom 
equal to k-1.   The Likelihood ratio test is specified as: 
2χ
2χ
}log){log( 1 kkcTLR Ω−Ω−= − ,   (3.6) 
where T = number of observations,   k = lag length, 
c = the number of parameters per equation under the alternative, and  
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kΩ = determinant of the estimated residual variance-covariance matrix obtained from the 
VAR(k) model.  
ii) The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
The AIC is calculated to select the model which has the minimal loss of information or 
the smallest AIC.  The AIC is specified as: 
 AIC (k) = Nk 2log +ΩT ,      (3.7) 
where N = total number of parameters estimated in all equations. 
iii) The Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SC) 
 SC (k) = )log(TNk +Ωlog .               (3.8) 
The SC is derived for the case of normally and independently distributed residuals and is 
the result of a Bayesian procedure of seeking the most appropriate model.  The order k of 
lag length is chosen so that AIC or SC criterion is minimized. 
 In this study, all three criteria are used to select the appropriate lag length for the 
VECM estimation.  To be sure that the selected lag length is appropriate and there is no 
autocorrelation in the model, a test for autocorrelation based on the Lagrange multiplier 
statistics (LM test) is performed.  The LM test for k-th order autocorrelation requires two-
step estimation under the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation.  The first step is 
to estimate each equation in the VAR model in equation (3.5) and obtain the regression 
residuals (u ) for t = 1, … , T.  In the second step, an auxiliary regression is estimated 
with the tth residual, u , regressed on the original set of regressors and u .  
The test is the joint significance of in the auxiliary regression.  The LM test 
t
tˆ ktt u −− ˆ,...,ˆ 1
ktt uu −− ˆ,...,ˆ 1
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statistic is   LM (k) = ( , where R is the R))( 2aRkT − 2a 2 obtained from the auxiliary 
regression and k is the order of lag length.  The LM test is asymptotically distributed as 
(k) distribution. 2χ
 
The VAR Estimation 
 With the appropriate lag length (k), the VAR model in equation (3.5) can be 
estimated if all price series are stationary [I(0)].   Since the right hand side of equation 
(3.5) contains only predetermined variables and the error terms are assumed to be serially 
correlated with constant variance (asssuming the appropriate lag length is chosen),   each 
equation can be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).  Moreover, OLS estimates 
are consistent and asymptotically efficient.   The estimation of the VAR model in 
equation (3.5) is done using the EView software package.  There are three applications of 
the VAR analysis employed in this study in order to investigate the price-response 
relationships among canned tuna brands.  They are the Granger-causality test, impulse 
response function (IRF) analysis, and forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) 
analysis. 
 
Testing for Granger-Causality  
The VAR model is employed in this study to test the assumption that a firm in the 
market sets its price depending on its prices and rivals’ prices from the past periods.   
Such an assumption can be tested using Granger-causality tests.  According to the price-
response elasticities obtained from the price-reaction functions in the first part (Table 
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4.9), Bumble Bee’s price does not affect price strategies of Starkist and Chicken of the 
Sea during the same time period.  Since Bumble Bee is one of the three leading brands in 
the market, it is interesting to test whether its past strategy affects the other two brands’ 
strategies.  In other words, it can be tested that Bumble Bee’s price Granger-causes 
Starkist’s and Chicken of the Sea’s price, and vice versa.     
It is difficult and not useful to interpret the relationships between variables from 
the coefficients in the estimated VAR models because the VAR models are over-
parameterized.  Therefore, Granger-causality test results obtained from the estimated 
VAR are the key solutions here.  For each equation in the VAR, the joint significance of 
each of the other lagged endogenous variables in that equation is tested based on the Chi-
square (Wald test) statistics.  The Wald test calculates the test statistic by estimating the 
unrestricted regression without imposing the coefficient restrictions specified by the null 
hypothesis. The null hypothesis is that Pj does not Granger-cause Ph, where Pj is the lag 
of an endogenous variable j on the right hand side of an equation and Ph is the 
endogenous variable h on the left hand side of that equation (j and h are Starkist, Chicken 
of the Sea, Bumble Bee, and Allother).  The Wald statistic measures how close the 
unrestricted estimates come to the restrictions under the null hypothesis.  If the 
restrictions are true, then the unrestricted estimates should not be different from those 
without restrictions. A dynamic relationship between two brands can be classified into 
three types.  For example, a pair of price series between Starkist and Bumble Bee is 
tested.  If the null hypothesis that the lags of Starkist’s price do not Granger-cause 
Bumble Bee’s price is rejected, whereas the null hypothesis that the lags of Bumble Bee’s 
price do not Granger-cause Starkist’s price cannot be rejected, it can be interpreted that 
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Starkist is a price leader and Bumble Bee is a price follower.  If both null hypotheses are 
rejected, it can be interpreted that the two firms conduct warfare (Vickner and Davies, 
2000).  However, if both null hypotheses cannot be rejected, it can be concluded that they 
are not interdependent in a dynamic way, i.e. they do not take into account each other’s 
past price strategies.      
 
Impulse Response Function and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Analyses 
 To investigate pricing relationships rigorously, the IRF and FEVD analysis are 
employed.   If there is a unitary change in a brand’s price at time t, the IRFs will give 
information about whether the brand’s price and its rivals’ prices respond to the shock in 
a positive or negative direction at time t+1, t+2, etc.  The IRF analysis reveals the 
direction of the relationships graphically between variables from a shock of one variable, 
whereas the FEVDs measure proportions of the forecast error variance of a brand’s price 
that can be explained by shocks to its own price and its rivals’ prices.  Theoretically, if 
none of the forecast error variances in a brand’s price at all forecast horizons can be 
explained by innovations on the other brands’ prices, the inference is the brand’s price 
series is exogenous.  If all price series are endogenous, the forecast error variance in a 
brand’s price can be explained by shocks on its price and the other brands’ prices at all 
forecast horizons.  The effects from shocks are reported as percentages.  For example, if 
50 percent of the three-period-ahead error variance in Bumble Bee’s price can be 
explained by innovations to Starkist’s price, then Starkist’s price has a large influence on 
the progress of Bumble Bee’s price.   The results from the IRF and FEVD analyses can 
serve as a way to confirm the dynamic price-relationship results obtained from the 
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Granger-causality tests.  Both IRFs and FEVDs are constructed from the VAR model 
with orthogonal residuals using the Choleski decomposition.    
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Chapter Four 
Estimation and Results 
 
 The strategic price-response relationships among canned tuna brands in the 
Knoxville market are analyzed using a VAR model.  The analysis starts with unit root 
tests for all price series using the ADF and PP tests.  Next, the lag length in the VAR 
model is selected using the LR, AIC and SC criteria.  Then, the VAR model with the 
appropriate lag length chosen is estimated.  Brands’ price-response relationships are 
examined by applications of the VAR analysis including Granger causality, IRF, and 
FEVD analyses. 
 
Testing for Unit Root and Order of Integration 
 The observed canned-tuna price series for Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, Bumble 
Bee, and Allother for 157 consecutive weeks are depicted in Figure 4.1.  The data 
descriptions are shown in Table 4.1 (chapter 4) of the first part.  All the prices seem to 
fluctuate around no trend (horizontal) lines.  However, more than a plot is needed to 
confirm stationarity.  Therefore, all price series are tested for unit roots and order of 
integration using the ADF test (equation (3.1)) and the PP test (equation (3.3)).  First, 
each price series is tested for a unit root using the original data.  If the estimated ADF or 
PP test statistic is greater than its respective critical value, it can be concluded that the 
price series is stationary.  If the null hypothesis that there exists a unit root in the series 
cannot be rejected, the series will be tested again with its first differences.  The tests are  
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 Figure 4.1 Observed Price Series of Canned Tuna Brands 
 
continued until a stationary series is found.  The results from the ADF and PP tests are 
shown in Table 4.1.  The ADF test results indicate that the price series of Starkist, 
Bumble Bee and Allother are stationary at their level [I(0)], whereas the price series of 
Chicken of the Sea has a unit root and becomes stationary for the first differences [I(1)].  
Charemza and Deadman (1992) suggested that the choice of number of augmentation 
terms (the lagged difference terms) included in an ADF equation was important and 
should be such that error terms in the equation are not auto-correlated.  The test results 
shown in Table 4.1 are based on the ADF equations that include 4 lagged differences. 
The ADF tests with 2, 3, and 5 lagged differences in each ADF equation are also tested  
 
 119 
Table 4.1  The ADF and PP Test Results on Price Series 
Price Series ADF Test Result 
[Level] 
ADF Test Result 
[First Difference] 
 
PP test Result 
[Level] 
Starkist Stationary (-3.56) _ Stationary (-9.52) 
Chicken of the Sea   Non-stationary (-1.37) Stationary (-8.69) Stationary (-4.35) 
Bumble Bee Stationary (-4.30) _ Stationary (-7.82) 
Allother Stationary (-3.37) _ Stationary (-8.77) 
All test equations include 4 lagged differences.  (ADF and PP t-statistics are in parentheses) 
The tests are based on the 5% level of significance with MacKinnon Critical Values = – 2.88. 
 
for a unit root, and the results are not different from those in Table 4.1.  On the contrary, 
when 6 lagged differences or more are used, the results are changed in favor to accepting 
the null hypothesis in all price series.  However, the coefficients of the 5th and 6th lagged-
difference variables in the ADF equation with 6 lagged-difference terms are not 
statistically significant.  Moreover, Charemza and Deadman (1992) suggested that too 
many augmentation terms may cause a decrease in power of the test, too often resulting 
in the failure to reject the null hypothesis.  Therefore, the ADF equations with more than 
4 lagged differences included may not be appropriate.   
The ADF test results from Table 4.1 cause a problem here.  If all variables are 
stationary, a VAR model can be used to estimate the dynamic-price responses.  A VEC 
model can be used when all variables are not stationary but are co-integrated.  It may not 
be appropriate to estimate a VAR model with three stationary variables and one non-
stationary variable because the estimated results will be spurious (Gujarati, 1995).  In 
addition, the VEC model with the use of co-integration cannot be used in this situation.  
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However, the results obtained from the ADF test are not the only ones that can be used, 
since there is the PP test, which can also be used to test for a unit root of a time series.  
The PP test results are also shown in Table 4.1.  All price series are found 
stationary at the 5% level of significant.  In addition, the PP tests with 2, 6, and 8 lagged 
differences included are also tested and inferences for the test results are the same as 
those shown in Table 4.1.  Choi (1992) conducted Monte Carlo experiments to study the 
effects of data aggregation on the power of the ADF and PP tests for a unit root.  Choi 
concluded that for the aggregate data the PP test was more powerful than the ADF test in 
finite samples.   Since the scanner data used in this study were aggregated and collected 
for a short time period, all price series are considered to be stationary based on the PP test 
results. 
 
Selecting for Lag Length 
Since all price series are stationary, the unrestricted VAR model specified in 
equation (3.5) can be used.  However, the appropriate lag length of the VAR must still be 
selected.  The appropriate lag length is chosen using the LR, AIC and SC tests and 
autocorrelation is also detected based on the Lagrange multiplier statistics (LM test).  
Table 4.2 summarizes the lag length selection from the LR, AIC, and SC, and the test 
results for autocorrelation from the LM test (at the 5 % level of significance).  The results 
from the LR and AIC indicate that k = 5 is appropriate, whereas the SC selects k = 2 as a 
proper lag length.  Vickner and Davies (2000) noted that AIC and SC may be biased 
toward shorter lag structures.  Therefore, the test for autocorrelation can be an additional  
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Table 4.2  Lag Length Criteria and Autocorrelation Test Results 
 
Criteria 
Number of lag length (k) 
selected 
LM Test for Autocorrelation 
[H0: No Autocorrelation] 
The Likelihood ratio test (LR) 5 Not rejected 
The Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) 
5 Not rejected 
The Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion (SC) 
2a Rejected 
aWhen k = 3 and 4 are selected, the null hypothesis of no auto-correlation was also rejected. 
 
indicator for the lag length selection.  The LM test results in Table 4.2 show that 
autocorrelation exists when k = 2 is selected.  In addition, auto-correlation is tested and 
found when k = 3 and k = 4, but there is no autocorrelation found when k = 5.   Therefore, 
this study chooses k = 5 as an appropriate lag length. 
 
The VAR Estimation 
 The four price series are estimated using the VAR model in equation (3.5) with 5 
lags for each series.   The estimated results are shown in Table 4.3.  The correlogram for 
60 weeks of lags indicated that none of the estimated-residual series has autocorrelation.  
For example, p-values for the Q-statistics in weeks 26 and 52 reported in Table 4.3 
surpass the 10% threshold, meaning that there is no autocorrelation up to these weeks.   
The model seems to be over-parameterized since there are 84 terms estimated and many 
of the non-significant coefficients should be excluded from the model.  Note that the 
objective here is to investigate dynamic strategic-price responses or interrelationships 
among the canned tuna brands.   Enders (1995) suggested that “improperly imposing zero 
restrictions may waste important information.”  Sims (1980) and Enders (1995)  
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Table 4.3   Parameter Estimates from the Vector Autoregressive Model  
      Dependent Variable: P 
Variable         SK  CS      BB        AO                                     
C      0.538**          0.278         0.955**              0.190                                     
     (2.741)         (1.179)  (2.737)       (1.329) 
 
PSKt-1       0.187*                 -0.052                  -0.303*         -0.024                                 
                                       (2.200)                 (-0.514)  (-2.009)     (-0.392)                                
 
PSKt-2      0.075             -0.029                 0.200                   0.066                                   
      (0.922)          (-0.289)   (1.308)      (1.058) 
 
PSKt-3      0.111           0.151              0.170                  -0.017                                 
      (1.279)          (1.451)   (1.100)     (-0.273) 
 
PSKt-4      0.107           0.127   -0.600**              0.005                                    
      (1.225)          (1.208)   (-3.865)     (0.081) 
 
PSKt-5      0.042                    -0.134                  0.402*         0.141*                                 
      (0.474)          (-1.242)   (2.522)               (2.165) 
 
PCSt-1      0.046         0.435**         -0.048      0.002                                    
      (0.627)         (5.071)   (-0.384)     (0.041) 
 
PCSt-2     -0.004         0.067         0.016      -0.127*                                 
     (-0.053)         (0.747)   (0.123)     (-2.328) 
 
PCSt-3      0.071         0.136                   -0.329 *      0.081                                   
      (0.956)         (1.514)  (-2.474)      (1.492) 
 
PCSt-4      -0.150         0.273**         0.167                  -0.044                                  
      (-1.953)         (2.959)   (1.224)     (-0.787) 
 
PCSt-5      -0.070         -0.009         -0.086       0.050                                   
      (-0.230)         (-0.098)   (-0.657)     (0.933) 
 
PBBt-1      -0.032        -0.103                   0.566**               0.048                                     
      (-0.687)         (-1.796)                (6.665)     (1.382) 
 
PBBt-2      -0.032        0.163**     -0.265**      -0.081*                                
      (-0.689)        (2.664)   (-2.943)     (-2.212) 
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Table 4.3   Parameter Estimates from the Vector Autoregressive Model (Continued) 
      Dependent Variable: P 
Variable         SK  CS      BB        AO                                     
PBBt-3       0.022        -0.095    0.176       0.035   
      (0.427)        (-1.561)    (1.957)     (0.944) 
 
PBBt-4      0.061          0.070         -0.260**     0.013                                    
      (1.215)         (1.151)   (-2.906)    (0.357) 
 
PBBt-5      -0.123**                -0.037                  0.159                -0.011                              
      (-2.673)          (-0.684)              (1.954)     (-0.339) 
 
PAOt-1      0.126          0.067         -0.026      0.307**                                 
      (1.069)         (0.485)   (-0.128)     (3.667) 
 
PAOt-2      0.130          0.143   -0.307         0.164                                    
      (1.077)          (0.985)   (-1.434)    (1.869) 
 
PAOt-3      0.003          -0.183   0.254        -0.059                                  
      (0.023)          (-1.238)              (1.162)     (-0.658) 
 
PAOt-4      0.044          -0.140    0.158                -0.050                          
      (0.369)          (-0.978)    (0.748)     (-0.579) 
 
PAOt-5      -0.220          -0.241    -0.013     0.182* 
     (-1.895)                  (-1.724)                (-0.062)             (2.153) 
 
Model Diagnostics 
Adj. R2                            0.13                      0.61     0.40                  0.18 
AIC      -2.17           -1.81                -1.03                -2.81 
SC      -1.76           -1.39      -0.61                 -2.39 
p-value of 
Q Statistic (Week 26)     0.96            0.85     0.27      0.64 
p-value of 
Q Statistic (Week 52)     0.92            0.95                      0.66      0.21 
 
(-) t-statistics are in parentheses 
*Significance at 5%level, **significance at 1% level 
Subscript: SK = Starkist,  CS = Chicken of the Sea, BB = Bumble Bee, AO = Allother 
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recommended that the goal of VAR analysis is to investigate the interrelationships among  
the variables, not the parameter estimates.   Moreover, the lags of each variable are likely 
to be highly collinear, so that the t-statistics on estimated coefficients may not be reliable 
guides to determine the relationships.  Therefore, Granger-causality test results obtained 
from the VAR analysis are more reliable for the investigation.    
 
Granger-Causality test Results 
The Granger-causality test results in terms of p-values based on the Chi-square 
statistics are reported in Table 4.4.  The test results can be summarized as follows.  All 
price series Granger-cause themselves implying that each brand considers its past prices 
in determining its present price strategy.  Starkist Granger-causes Bumble Bee, and 
Bumble Bee also Granger-causes Starkist.  This implies that the strategic-price response 
between Starkist and Bumble Bee represents a price war.  Chicken of the Sea and Bumble 
Bee also Granger-cause each other indicating that these two brands conduct warfare.  
Starkist, and Chicken of the Sea do not Granger-cause each other, meaning that they are 
not inter-dependent with respect to dynamic-pricing behavior.  In other words, they do 
not consider the past prices of one another in their price strategies.  Interestingly, Allother 
Granger-causes Chicken of the Sea, but it is not true in the opposite direction.  Vickner 
and Davies (2000) suggested the evidence of price leadership when there was 
unidirectional Granger causality.  However, their conclusion about price leadership was 
also based on the IRF-analysis results, which showed a positive relationship between the 
leader and the follower.  Therefore, the price-response relationship between Chicken of 
the Sea and Allother is analyzed with the results from IRF analysis. 
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Table 4.4 Granger-Causality Test Results 
     p-value of Chi-square statistics 
Equation   PSK  PCS  PBB  PAO 
PSK             0.010***           0.428            0.083*            0.202 
PCS             0.407           0.000***            0.061*            0.095* 
PBB             0.000***           0.031**            0.000***           0.603             
PAO             0.263           0.193                0.265            0.000*** 
*Significance at the 10% level, **significance at 5% level, and ***significance at 1% level 
The null hypothesis is that the column variables do not Granger-cause the row variables.  
 
The Granger-causality test results give additional information on the results 
obtained from (static) simultaneous equations in the first part.  Starkist’s and Chicken of 
the Sea’s prices significantly affect Bumble Bee’s price strategy both in static and 
dynamic approaches.   Bumble Bee’s price does not affect Starkist’s and Chicken of the 
Sea’s price strategies during the same time period, but its past price does. 
 
Impulse Response Function Analysis 
IRF analysis is an application of VAR analysis to characterize dynamic price-
response strategies among canned tuna brands in the market.  When there is a one-unit 
increase of a brand’s price due to an exogenous shock (such as sudden changes in input 
prices or tuna quantity) during period t, it may affect the brand’s future prices and those 
of rivals.  An IRF of a brand reveals the direction of the brand’s price response in the 
future periods due to a shock of a variable during period t.  The cumulative IRFs for 20 
periods are computed and graphically presented in Figures 4.2 to 4.5, shown on the 
following pages.  Figure 4.2 depicts the time path of Starkist’s price series response to a  
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unit change in the innovations of itself and the other brands’ prices.  A price-series time 
path line is between its standard errors (the confidence interval) presented as dash lines.   
According to Figure 4.2, Starkist positively reacts to its own price shocks, and the 
response dies out rapidly in two weeks.  Starkist does not react to the innovations of 
Chicken of the Sea’s and Allother’s prices.  However, a unit shock on Bumble Bee’s price 
has a negative effect on Starkist’s price since its response during week 7 is statistically 
significant.   
Chicken of the Sea’s price responses are shown in Figure 4.3.  Chicken of the Sea 
also positively reacts to its own shock.  It takes approximately 16 weeks for Chicken of 
the Sea’s price shock to dissipate from its own shocks.  Chicken of the Sea does not 
respond to innovations of Starkist.  However, it responds negatively to shocks on Bumble 
Bee’s price for the first two weeks before adjusting to equilibrium.  In addition, Chicken 
of the Sea responds negatively to shocks on Allother’s price because the cumulative IRF 
during week 6 is statistically significant.   
According to Figure 4.4, Bumble Bee responds negatively to a unit shock on 
Chicken of the Sea’s price because its response during week 4 is statistically significant.  
These IRF results support the Granger-causality test results that Bumble Bee and Chicken 
of the Sea conduct warfare.  With respect to a unit shock to Starkist’s price, Bumble Bee 
also responds negatively since the IRFs of week 2 and 5 are statistically significant.  This 
interaction result also supports the results found from the Granger-causality test that 
Starkist and Bumble Bee conduct warfare because they respond to each other negatively.   
Bumble Bee reacts positively to its own shocks and adjusts quickly to equilibrium in 
about three weeks.   
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Figure 4.5 depicts Allother’s price which positively reacts to its own shocks and 
the price response decreases rapidly in two weeks.  There is only a unit shock on Chicken 
of the Sea’s price to which Allother negatively responds.    
The Granger-causality test results show a unidirectional causality between 
Chicken of the Sea and Allother such that Allother’s prices Granger-cause Chicken of the 
Sea’s prices.  Vickner and Davies (2000) suggested the evidence of price leadership when 
there was unidirectional Granger causality.  Vickner and Davies investigated the price-
response relationship between two leading canned pineapple brands, Dole and Del 
Monte.  They found that Del Monte followed Dole’s pricing decisions.  Their Granger-
causality results were unidirectional.  Their conclusion about price leadership was also 
based on the IRF-analysis results, which showed a positive relationship between the 
leader and the follower.   In contrast, the IRF results shown in Figure 4.3 indicate that 
Chicken of the Sea responds negatively to a unit shock on Allother’s price.  Therefore, it 
cannot be concluded that Allother is the price leader and Chicken of the Sea is the price 
follower.  In addition, the IRF results from Figure 4.5 show that Allother responds 
negatively to a unit shock on Chicken of the Sea’s price.  Therefore, the evidence of price 
war between the two brands is a more reasonable conclusion.   
The IRF results reported in this part are different from those of Vickner and 
Davies.  Confidence intervals in the Vickner and Davies IRF graphs were not shown.  In 
other words, the level of significance was not considered in their IRF analysis.  The 
confidence intervals in the IRF analysis are necessary to determine whether a shock on 
one variable significantly affects the other variable.  For example, this part concludes that 
there is no dynamic price response between Starkist and Chicken of the Sea because 
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Starkist’s IRF responding to Chicken of the Sea’s innovation (Figure 4.2) and Chicken of 
the Sea’s IRF responding to Starkist’s innovation (Figure 4.3) are not statistically 
significant.   Their confidence intervals (represented as dash lines) cover zero levels for 
all time periods.  Failing to take into account the confidence intervals, especially 
estimating VAR in levels, may lead to inaccurate conclusions.   
 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Analysis 
 At each horizon (period), the FEVDs measure the percentage of the forecast error 
in a brand’s price that is explained by its own innovation as well as by the innovations 
that have occurred from competitors’ prices.  The FEVD analysis is performed for 157 
periods ahead in order to see the forecast effects from innovations during the observation 
period; however, only 1 to 4 (one month), 9 (two months), 26 (six months), 52 (one year), 
and 157 (three years) periods ahead are reported here.  The FEVD results are shown in 
Table 4.5.  Overall, the error variances in Starkist’s prices are generally accounted for by  
innovations to its own prices.  The one-period-ahead error variance in Starkist’s price 
responds entirely to its own shock.  After 9 periods ahead, innovations to Starkist’s price 
can be explained by its own shock (about 87.7%) and by shocks to Bumble Bee’s and 
Allother’s prices (about 4.9% and 5.1%, respectively).  The shocks on the other brands’ 
prices have small effects on Starkist’s price, and the proportions of error variances in the 
9 periods ahead approximately represent the long-run FEVDs because the percentages of 
error variances are quite stable after that.    
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Table 4.5  Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Results  
            
     Period S.E. SK CS BB AO 
SK           
1 0.076 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 0.078 98.60 0.26 0.35 0.80 
3 0.080 95.82 0.33 1.24 2.61 
4 0.082 94.26 1.10 1.21 3.42 
9 0.088 87.65 2.30 4.97 5.08 
26 0.089 86.89 2.66 5.33 5.11 
52 0.090 86.76 2.76 5.32 5.15 
157 0.090 86.72 2.80 5.32 5.16 
CS           
1 0.092 0.03 99.97 0.00 0.00 
2 0.101 0.06 97.87 1.93 0.14 
3 0.105 0.10 96.34 2.43 1.13 
4 0.108 0.39 96.19 2.35 1.07 
9 0.136 1.87 92.07 1.58 4.49 
26 0.176 1.79 84.09 1.04 13.08 
52 0.196 2.44 81.04 0.93 15.59 
157 0.202 2.62 80.23 0.90 16.25 
BB           
1 0.136 0.64 0.36 99.00 0.00 
2 0.159 3.91 0.26 95.81 0.01 
3 0.160 3.89 0.34 94.10 1.67 
4 0.165 4.81 3.95 89.56 1.68 
9 0.175 9.82 6.84 81.02 2.31 
26 0.185 9.64 12.63 73.27 4.47 
52 0.190 9.42 15.36 69.67 5.55 
157 0.191 9.35 16.27 68.47 5.90 
 AO           
1 0.056 0.35 0.19 0.06 99.40 
2 0.059 0.37 0.22 1.13 98.27 
3 0.062 0.78 3.71 1.85 93.66 
4 0.062 0.94 3.71 1.85 93.51 
9 0.066 4.80 5.13 1.74 88.32 
26 0.069 7.22 7.16 2.00 83.62 
52 0.069 7.20 8.22 1.98 82.60 
157 0.069 7.19 8.58 1.97 82.26 
            
FEVDs are read from left to right.   For each horizon, the error variance of a brand’s price is 
explained in percentage by shocks on column variables.  
SK = Starkist, CS = Chicken of the Sea, BB = Bumble Bee, and AO = Allother 
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Chicken of the Sea’s price response is different from that of Starkist.  During the 
first month ahead, about 96% of innovations to Chicken of the Sea’s price can be 
explained by shocks from its own price.   In a longer time period (after 6 months ahead), 
approximately 13.1% of the forecast error variance of Chicken of the Sea’s price can be 
explained by shocks to Allother’s price, whereas shocks to Starkist’s and Bumble Bee’s 
prices have small effect to Chicken of the Sea’s price innovations.   This result supports 
the IRF results in that Allother has a negative influence on Chicken of the Sea’s price. 
Ninety-eight percent of the one-period-ahead error variance in Bumble Bee’s price 
can be explained shocks from its own prices.  However, after about six months ahead 
shocks to the other brands’ prices account for more than 26% of innovations to Bumble 
Bee’s price.  Specifically, Starkist and Chicken of the Sea account for approximately 10% 
and 13%, respectively.  These results support the IRF results in that the variability of 
Bumble Bee’s prices is affected by shocks to Starkist’s and Chicken of the Sea’s prices.    
Allother price innovations are affected almost entirely by shocks to its prices in 
the short periods ahead (one month).  After 6 months ahead shocks to Starkist’s and 
Chicken of the Sea’s prices account for approximately 7% of Allother’s price innovations.  
Chicken of the Sea’s price shocks have the highest influence on Allother price 
innovations in the long period.  This also supports the IRF results in that Chicken of the 
Sea and Allother have negative effect to each other.   
 Overall, the IRF results are consistent with the Granger-causality test results in 
that Starkist’s and Chicken of the Sea’s price strategies negatively respond to Bumble 
Bee’s price strategy in a dynamic way.  Moreover, the FEVD results support the IRF and 
Granger-causality test results in that both Starkist’s and Chicken of the Sea’s past prices 
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have high influence on Bumble Bee’s present price.  Finally, there is no dynamic 
relationship between Starkist’s and Chicken of the Sea’s price strategies.   
 
Summary of Results 
The four price series of Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, Bumble Bee, and Allother are 
used to estimate strategic price-response relationships based on a dynamic approach 
using VAR analysis.  The results are as follows. 
 
• The ADF and PP tests are used to test for a unit root in each series.  The 
results suggest all four price series are stationary. 
 
• The LR, AIC and SC tests are employed to select the appropriate lag length 
and autocorrelation is tested for each equation in the VAR with the lag length 
selected by these criteria.  The test results indicate that five lags are 
appropriate in the VAR estimation. 
 
• A VAR model of order five with four price variables is estimated using OLS 
for each equation.   
 
• Price-response relationships are analyzed by applications of VAR including 
Granger-causality, IRF, and FEVD analyses. 
 
• The results from Granger-causality tests indicate that the price-response 
relationships between Starkist and Bumble Bee and between Chicken of the 
Sea and Bumble Bee are bidirectional meaning that both pairs of brands 
conduct warfare.  The price-response relationship between Chicken of the Sea 
and Allother is unidirectional implying that the lags of Allother’s price affect 
Chicken of the Sea’s price decision.  In addition, the Granger-causality results 
show that no dynamic relationships occur among Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, 
and Allother. 
 
• With respect to the IRF results, Starkist’s price responds negatively to a unit 
shock from the Bumble Bee price and the reverse is also true.  Chicken of the 
Sea’s and Bumble Bee’s prices respond negatively to a unit shock of price of 
each other, and so does the price relationship between Chicken of the Sea and 
Allother.   The IRF results support the Granger-causality results (with the 
exception of the Chicken of the Sea-Allother relationship) in that all pairs of 
brands conduct price war.  All brands’ prices react to their own shock and 
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revert to equilibrium in about three weeks with the exception of Chicken of 
the Sea’s price series that takes approximately 16 weeks to die out.   
 
• The FEVD analysis is conducted for 157 periods ahead.  Overall, all price 
series’ forecast error variances are explained mainly by shocks to their own 
prices. However, 20% of forecast error variance in Bumble Bee’s price after 
26-periods ahead is explained by shocks on Starkist’s and Chicken of the 
Sea’s price.  The portion of error variance in Bumble Bee’s price from outside 
shocks is relatively high compared to those of the other brands. 
 
• The IRF and FEVD results are consistent with the Granger-causality test 
results in that Starkist’s and Chicken of the Sea’s price strategies negatively 
respond to Bumble Bee’s price strategy in a dynamic way.  In addition, both 
Starkist’s and Chicken of the Sea’s past prices have high influence on Bumble 
Bee’s present price.   
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Chapter Five 
Conclusions 
 
The second part of this dissertation estimates strategic price-response among 
canned tuna brands in the Knoxville, Tennessee market.  Unlike the first part, the 
Bertrand-competition assumption is dropped and replaced by the assumption that a firm 
in the market sets its price depending on its own past prices and those of rivals.   A vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model is employed to investigate the dynamic-price relationships 
among the four price series of Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, and Bumble Bee, and Allother.  
The first step of the analysis is to test whether each price series is stationary.  The 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test are employed to 
test for stationary.  The ADF test results show that Chicken of the Sea’s price series is not 
stationary, while the other price series are stationary.  On the other hand, the PP test 
results indicate that all price series are stationary.   This study concluded that all price 
series are stationary based on the PP test results because of the finding of Choi (1992) 
that the PP test was more powerful than the ADF test for the aggregate data in finite 
samples.   
Since all price series are stationary, the unrestricted VAR model can be used for 
estimation.   However, a proper lag length must be selected before the VAR model is 
estimated so that the error terms of each equation in the model are not serially correlated.  
The appropriate lag length is selected using the likelihood ratio (LR) test, the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SC).  To be sure that 
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autocorrelation does not exist in each equation in the VAR of the order of the selected lag 
length, the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test is also performed.   The test results conclude 
that the appropriate lag length is five.   
The VAR model of order 5 is estimated.  The interrelationships among the price 
series are analyzed by applications of VAR including the Granger-causality test, impulse 
response function (IRF) analysis, and forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) 
analysis.  Granger-causality tests examine pairs of brands’ prices and tests whether a 
brand’s past prices Granger-cause the other brand’s price strategy.  If both brands 
Granger-cause each other, it means that they conduct warfare.  IRF analyses reveals 
graphically the direction of the relationships between price series from a shock of a 
brand’s price, whereas the FEVD analysis measures proportions of error variance of a 
brand’s price that can be explained by shocks to its own price and it rivals’ prices for 
each forecast horizon.   
The Granger-causality test results indicate that there are interrelationships 
between price strategies of Starkist and Bumble Bee, and between price strategies of 
Chicken of the Sea and Bumble Bee.  Both of them conduct price war.   There are no 
dynamic interrelationships between Starkist and Chicken of the Sea.  Allother Granger-
causes Chicken of the Sea, but it is not true in the opposite direction.  All price-response 
relationships are investigated further using the IRF results.  The price-response 
relationships found from Granger-causality tests are supported by the IRF analysis.  The 
IRF results show graphically that when there is a unit shock on Bumble Bee’s price, at 
some point of the time, both Starkist’s and Chicken of the Sea’s prices respond 
negatively.  Similarly, Bumble Bee’s price also responds negatively to a unit shock on 
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either Starkist’s or Chicken of the Sea’s prices.  The IRF results also show that Chicken of 
the Sea and Allother respond negatively to a unit shock of each other’s price.  The FEVD 
results also support these two brands’ price relationships. This leads to the inference that 
they conduct price war.  The FEVDs are estimated for 157 horizons ahead.  Shocks on 
each brand’s price mainly explain the error variance of the brand’s price, especially up to 
the first-4-periods ahead.  When the forecast time period is longer, the portion of error 
variance of each price series that can be explained by shocks on its own price is 
decreased gradually and the portions of error variance explained by shocks on the other 
brands’ prices typically increase.    After 26 periods ahead, the forecast error variance in 
Bumble Bee’s price has a relatively high portion (20%) attributed by shocks on Starkist’s 
and Chicken of the Sea’s prices.    
Although the results from the first part indicate that Starkist and Chicken of the 
Sea do not respond to Bumble Bee’s price strategy during the same time period, the 
results from the Granger-causality test, the IRF and FEVD analyses show that both 
Starkist and Chicken of the Sea negatively respond to Bumble Bee’s past price.  
Moreover, both Starkist’s and Chicken of the Sea’s past prices have high influence on 
Bumble Bee’s present price.  Finally, there is no dynamic relationship between Starkist’s 
and Chicken of the Sea’s price strategies.   
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General Conclusions 
 
There are two main objectives of this dissertation.  The first objective is to 
estimate the degree of market power in a product-differentiated oligopoly, in this instance 
the canned tuna industry at the local level.  The second objective is to investigate 
strategic-price responses among firms in the industry based on the static and dynamic 
approaches.  The weekly scanner data on the purchases of canned-tuna in Knoxville, 
Tennessee collected by Information Resources, Incorporated (IRI) from January 4, 1998 
to December 31, 2000 were used for the estimation of the degree of market power and 
strategic-price responses.  Four canned tuna brands are investigated including the three 
leading brands, Starkist, Chicken of the Sea, and Bumble Bee, and an aggregate of small-
market share brands, Allother.    
This study is composed of two parts.  The first part is based on a static approach, 
and the second part is based on a dynamic approach.  One of the main assumptions made 
in the first part is that the canned tuna market is operated as Bertrand competition such 
that price is a strategic variable, and firms make their price decisions during the same 
time period.  The degrees of market power and strategic-price responses among firms are 
estimated in the first part.  Measures of the degree of market power include the 
Rothschild index (RI), the O index (OI) and the Chamberlin quotient (CQ).  In order to 
calculate these measures, each firm’s own-and cross-price elasticities and price-response 
elasticities are needed.  These elasticities are estimated by the simultaneous demand-
supply equations.  Following Cotterill (1994), this study employs the linear approximate 
almost ideal demand system (LA/AIDS) proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) to 
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estimate the demand for canned tuna in the market, and price-reaction functions are used 
to investigate strategic-price response among firms.  The LA/AIDS uses the Stone price 
index.  Previous studies employed the LA/AIDS to estimate the degree of market power 
in oligopoly markets (Cotterill, 1994, and Vickner and Davies, 1999).  However, use of 
the Stone index in the LA/AIDS causes estimated parameters to be biased and 
inconsistent (Pashardes, 1993 and Moschini, 1995).  One of the contributions in this 
dissertation is to use the corrected Stone index suggested by Moschini (1995) in the 
LA/AIDS estimation.   
The degree of market power of a brand in this study means that the brand is able 
to set a high price without losing its market share.  A brand’s market power is derived 
from two sources.  First, it arises from the brand’s unilateral market power due to brand 
characteristics and product differentiation, and the RI represents such power.  Second, the 
brand’s market power is derived from tacit collusion meaning that the brand can 
influence its rivals to follow its strategy, such as a price increase.  The OI and CQ 
typically represent this kind of market power. 
The results of the measures of market power found in this dissertation are 
consistent with those of Cotterill (1994) and Vickner and Davies (1999) in that the 
leading firms which are able to maintain high price and market shares have high degrees 
of market power.  Starkist, the highest-market share brand, has the highest degree of 
market power.  The market power of Starkist and Chicken of the Sea is derived from both 
unilateral and coordinated market power, whereas that of Bumble Bee is derived from its 
own unilateral market power, not from coordinated market power.  In addition, this 
dissertation re-estimates the simultaneous equations with the use of the traditional Stone 
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index in the LA/AIDS, and the parameter estimates are compared to those of the 
corrected version.  The results from both versions are found to be very close giving the 
interpretation of market power in the same fashion.   
The strategic-price responses among brands are investigated through price-
response elasticities obtained from the estimated price-reaction functions.  Starkist and 
Chicken of the Sea have a positive effect on each other’s price strategy.  This positive 
relationship serves as a reason why the two leading firms have coordinated market power.   
Starkist and Chicken of the Sea have negative effects on Bumble Bee’s price strategy 
leading to an inference that Bumble Bee conducts price war against the two leading 
brands.  On the other hand, Bumble Bee has no influence on Starkist’s and Chicken of the 
Sea’s price strategies.  This also supports the findings of Bumble Bee’s degree of market 
power in that its degree of market power is mainly derived from unilateral market power 
without coordination from the other brands.   However, Bumble Bee is one of the three 
leading brands in the canned tuna oligopoly market.  Therefore, price strategies should be 
expected to be interdependent.  Although Starkist and Chicken of the Sea do not respond 
to Bumble Bee’s price strategy during the same time period, they may consider Bumble 
Bee’s past price in their present decisions.  This leads to an extension to the second part 
of this dissertation which is based on a dynamic approach.    
With respect to the second part, the Bertrand-competition assumption is replaced 
by an assumption that a firm in the market sets its price depending on its own past prices 
and those of rivals.  A vector autoregressive (VAR) model is employed, and its 
applications are used to investigate the dynamic price relationships.  The VAR’s 
applications are the Granger-causality test, the impulse response function (IRF) analysis, 
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and the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) analysis.  The Granger-causality 
test examines whether dynamic price-response relationships exist.  The IRF analysis 
graphically reveals the direction of the effect of a one-time shock to one of the 
innovations on future values of the endogenous variables, whereas the FEVD analysis 
measures proportions of a brand’s price variations that can be explained by shocks to its 
own price and it rivals’ prices for each forecast horizon.  Although the results from the 
first part indicate that Starkist and Chicken of the Sea do not respond Bumble Bee’s price 
strategy during the same time period, the Granger-causality results show that both 
Starkist and Chicken of the Sea respond negatively to Bumble Bee’s past price.  Both 
leading brands conduct price war in a dynamic way.  The findings from the second part 
actually clarify a question about why the two leading brands do not respond to Bumble 
Bee during the same time period.  In addition, the second part finds that Starkist and 
Chicken of the Sea have no dynamic price relationships.  The results from the IRF and 
FEVD analyses also support the Granger-causality test results for the three-leading 
canned-tuna brands’ relationships.   
Overall, the results from both parts of this dissertation provide helpful insights on 
the degree of market power and strategic-price responses among brands in the canned 
tuna market.  This dissertation finds evidence of market power in the canned tuna market 
in Knoxville, Tennessee.  The extent of the average RI and OI found in this study is less 
than those found in the carbonated soft drink industry (Cotterill, 1994), but higher than 
those found in the spaghetti sauce industry (Vickner and Davies, 1999).  However, the 
average degree of market power derived from tacit collusion found in this study is the 
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lowest compared to those found in the carbonated soft drink and the spaghetti sauce 
industries.   
The results from the second part give additional information about firms’ price 
strategies such that a short-run dynamic equilibrium exists.  This can be explained by two 
reasons.  First, there exists a price adjustment lag among firms.  The time between when 
a firm desires to change price and when it can change price is longer than one observation 
period.  The second reason occurs when firms switch their price strategies in different 
weeks.  This strategy allows firms to avoid rigorous competition during the same time 
period.  The long-run equilibrium is not discussed in this study because the observation 
period is short (three years), and firms’ strategies can be changed in the longer period.  
Nonetheless, the study of strategic-price responses based on both static and dynamic 
approaches provides a significantly better understanding of firms’ pricing behaviors.    
 
Contributions, Limitations, and Extensions of this Research 
Contributions of this research 
This dissertation contributes to the empirical research in industrial organization in 
three ways.  First, it improves the model specification in estimating the degree of market 
power developed by Cotterill (1994) and followed by Vickner and Davies (1999).   In 
their studies, Cotterill (1994), and Vickner and Davies (1999) measured the degree of 
market power in the carbonated soft drink industry (Cotterill) and the spaghetti sauce 
industry (Vickner and Davies) by estimating the LA/AIDS model and price reaction 
functions simultaneously.   In the LA/AIDS, they used the Stone price index suggested by 
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Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).  In this study, the corrected Stone index suggested by 
Moschini (1995) was used in the LA/AIDS model.    
Second, this study is the first to examine the degree of competitiveness of brands 
of a manufactured food product at the local level where competition may be most intense.  
Work to date on food manufacturers’ degree of market power and pricing strategies has 
been conducted at the aggregate national level (Appelbaum, 1982; Schroeter, 1988; 
Baker and Breshnahan, 1985; Liang, 1989; Cotterill, 1994; and Vickner and Davies, 
1999).  These studies have not captured local market effects of pricing conduct and local 
demand.  This dissertation provides information regarding the degree of competitiveness 
and price-response strategies among firms in a local market.  
Third, this dissertation extends the analysis of brands’ price-response strategies to 
a dynamic approach.  A vector autoregressive (VAR) model and its applications are 
employed to investigate such relationships.  The results obtained from the first part give 
information about price-response relationships in a static way.  No price responses are 
found on Starkist’s and Chicken of the Sea’s price decisions against that of Bumble Bee 
during the same time period.  However, the second part finds that both Starkist and 
Chicken of the Sea responded to Bumble Bee in a dynamic way.   The second part 
contributes to the literature in that the study of firms’ strategic-price responses based on 
both static and dynamic approaches is more representative of the real world.  
 
Limitations of This Research 
There are several limitations of this dissertation.  The first limitation is due to the 
lack of brand-specific cost data.   If these data are developed, better demand and price 
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equations can be estimated.  Second, there was a limitation in promotional-activity data.  
This study was not able to take into account the effects of the use of brands’ coupons 
because IRI does not report the extent of their use.  Third, the observation period is short.  
This may be a reason why there was no difference between the use of the Stone index and 
the corrected Stone index.  The small number of observations may also affect the 
estimation of the dynamic price-response relationships in the second part.  Generally, a 
price series is not stationary over time.  The small sample size might be a reason why the 
four price series in this dissertation were found to be stationary.   Finally, the price-
response analysis in the second part investigates only whether the price relationships 
exist.  The VAR’s applications do not provide statistical magnitudes concerning the price 
relationships. 
  
Extensions of This Research 
This dissertation can be extended in several ways.  The first way is to include 
store brands as key variables in the estimation of degree of market power and price-
response strategies among the canned tuna brands in a local market.  In this dissertation, 
store brands were included in Allother.  However, store brands such as Kroger and BI-LO 
may have some effects on the national brands’ demand and price strategies.   Including 
store brands as key variables in the estimation should give better information about firms’ 
pricing behaviors in a local market.  The second extension is to apply this empirical 
method based on both static and dynamic approaches to the other markets or products.  
Another extension of this research is to find a way to include both static and dynamic 
information in the estimation of the degree of market power.  Measures of the degree of 
 148 
market power need information of demand and price-response elasticities based on a 
static approach.  Since this dissertation has shown that firms’ price strategies are both 
static and dynamic, future studies might find a method to measure the degree of market 
power that is able to take into account both static and dynamic information in their 
investigations.   
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